Linear-Quadratic Zero-Sum Mean-Field Type Games: Optimality Conditions
  and Policy Optimization by Carmona, René et al.
LINEAR-QUADRATIC ZERO-SUM MEAN-FIELD TYPE GAMES:
OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS AND POLICY OPTIMIZATION
R. CARMONA, K. HAMIDOUCHE, M. LAURIÈRE, AND Z. TAN
Abstract. In this paper, zero-sum mean-field type games (ZSMFTG) with linear dynamics and qua-
dratic cost are studied under infinite-horizon discounted utility function. ZSMFTG are a class of games
in which two decision makers whose utilities sum to zero, compete to influence a large population of
indistinguishable agents. In particular, the case in which the transition and utility functions depend on
the state, the action of the controllers, and the mean of the state and the actions, is investigated. The
optimality conditions of the game are analysed for both open-loop and closed-loop controls, and explicit
expressions for the Nash equilibrium strategies are derived. Moreover, two policy optimization methods
that rely on policy gradient are proposed for both model-based and sample-based frameworks. In the
model-based case, the gradients are computed exactly using the model, whereas they are estimated using
Monte-Carlo simulations in the sample-based case. Numerical experiments are conducted to show the
convergence of the utility function as well as the two players’ controls.
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1. Introduction
Decision making in multi-agent systems has recently received an increasing interest from both theoreti-
cal and empirical viewpoints. For instance, multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been applied
successfully to problems ranging from self-driving cars and robotics to games, while game-theoretic mod-
els have been exploited to study several prominent decision-making problems in engineering, economics
and finance.
In multi-agent systems, a large number of interacting agents either cooperate or compete to optimize
a certain individual or common goal. MARL and stochastic games were shown to model well systems
with a small number of agents. However, as the number of agents becomes large, analysing such systems
becomes intractable due to the exponential growth of agent interactions and the prohibitive compu-
tational cost. To tackle this issue, mean-field approximations, borrowed from statistical physics, were
considered to study the limit behaviour of systems in which the agents are indistinguishable and their
decisions are influenced by the empirical distribution of the other agents.
Mean-field games (MFGs) [39, 42] and their variants mean-field type control (MFC) [14] and mean-
field type games (MFTG) [10] consist of studying the global behaviour of systems composed of infinitely
many agents which interact in a symmetric manner. In particular, the mean-field approximation captures
all agent-to-agent interactions that, individually, have a negligible influence on the overall system’s
evolution.
An MFG corresponds to the asymptotic limit of the situation in which all the agents compete to
minimize their individual utility. In this case, the solution concept is a Nash equilibrium, in which a
typical agent is worse-off if she deviates unilaterally. From the point of view of the global system, a better
solution can be found by a central planner who tries to minimize the social utility by prescribing the
control that each agent should use. This leads to the notion of MFC, which can be viewed as the optimal
control of a McKean-Vlasov (MKV) dynamics, in which the evolution of the state process is influenced by
its own distribution. Last, mean-field type games are a framework that models control problems involving
several decision makers and mean-field interactions. Typical motivations are problems in which large
coalitions compete or in which several agents try to influence a large population [16,32]. These three types
of models have found numerous applications [12], e.g. in finance [21], energy production [8, 13], crowd
motion [3, 4], wireless communications [40,45,47], distributed robotics [43] and systemic risk [24,34].
In the past decade, many contributions have contributed to develop the theory of such mean-field
problems. In order to study their solutions, a key point is the derivation of optimality conditions, which
are typically phrased either in terms of partial differential equations (PDEs) or in terms of forward-
backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). For a detailed account, see e.g. [15, 20, 23] and
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the references therein. As a cornerstone for applications, the development of numerical methods for
these mean-field problems has also attracted a growing interest. Assuming full knowledge of the model,
methods for which convergence guarantees have been established include finite difference schemes for
partial differential equations [1,2], semi-Lagrangian schemes [22], augmented Lagrangian or primal-dual
methods [5, 17, 18], value iteration algorithm [9], or neural network based stochastic methods [26, 27];
see e.g. [6] for a recent overview. However, in many practical situations, the model is not fully known
and these methods can not be employed. Hence model-free or sample-based methods, in which the
optimization is performed while having only access to a simulator instead of knowing the model, have
recently been investigated. For mean-field games, fixed-point [38] or fictitious play scheme [35] have
been combined with model-free methods to compute the best response, whereas for mean-field control
problems, the solution has been approximated using policy gradient [28] or Q-learning [29, 37]. Despite
recent progress, these methods remain restricted to mean-field problems with simple structures which
have a common point: the decision makers are either infinitesimal and identical players or a single central
planner. More complex models are often needed to tackle applications, such as settings in which a mean-
field dynamics is influenced by several distinguishable decision makers. Such situations can typically be
modeled by a MFTG.
An archetypal MFTG is the case of mean-field zero-sum games. Two-player zero-sum games in
their standard stochastic form, with no mean-field interactions, have been extensively studied in the
literature [49]. In this class of games, two decision makers compete to respectively maximize and
minimize the same utility function. The large literature on this topic is motivated by many applications
and by connections with robust control [11]. Recently, generalizations to the case where the state
dynamics is of MKV type have been introduced in continuous time over a finite time horizon. Optimality
conditions have been derived using the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs)
in [50], using the dynamic programming principle and partial differential equations (PDEs) in [30] or
using a weak formulation in [31]. All these works assume that the controls take values in a compact
space, and hence are not applicable to a general linear-quadratic setting. Along a different line, zero-
sum games with mean-field interactions have also attracted interest for their connections with generative
adversarial nets (GANs) [19,33].
Although general stochastic problems with mean-field interactions can be studied from a theoretical
perspective, explicit computation of the solution and numerical illustration of the Nash equilibrium
are challenging. In standard optimal control, linear-quadratic (LQ) models, where the dynamics are
linear and the cost is quadratic, usually have analytical or easily tractable solutions, which makes
them very popular. These problems have also been considered in the optimization and machine learning
communities, since algorithms with proof of convergence can be developed, see e.g. [36] where the authors
prove convergence of model-based and sample-based policy gradient methods for a LQ optimal control
problem. Sample-based methods have also been used to solve (standard) LQ zero-sum games. In [7],
a discrete-time linear quadratic zero-sum game with infinite time horizon is studied and a Q-learning
algorithm is proposed, which is proved to converge to the Nash equilibrium. In [51], the authors study
LQ zero-sum games and propose three projected nested-gradient methods that are shown to converge to
the Nash equilibrium of the game. However, none of these contributions tackle mean-field interactions
in a zero-sum setting.
In the present work, under a discrete time, infinite-horizon and discounted utility function, we inves-
tigate zero-sum mean-field type games (ZSMFTG) of linear-quadratic type, which, to the best of our
knowledge, had not been the focus of any work before. In particular, we address the case in which the
transition and utility functions do not only depend on the state and the action of the controllers, but
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also the mean of the state and the actions. Moreover, the state is subject to a common noise. The
structure of the problem and the infinite horizon regime allow us to identify the form of the equilibrium
controls as linear combinations of the state and its mean conditioned on the common noise, both in the
open-loop and the closed-loop settings. To learn the equilibrium, we extend the policy-gradient tech-
niques developed in [28] for MFC, to the ZSMFTG framework. We design policy optimization methods
in which the gradients are either computed exactly using the LQ model or estimated using Monte-Carlo
samples when the model is not fully known.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the zero-sum mean-field type game is
formulated, preceded by aN -agent control problem which motivates this setting. In Section 3, we present
the rigorous probabilistic setup for the zero-sum mean-field type game under consideration. Open-loop
controls are investigated in Section 4. After defining the set of admissible controls, we prove a Pontryagin
maximum principle giving necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality, see Propositions 12 and 14.
Section 5 considers closed-loop controls which are linear in the state and the mean. Focusing on the
coefficients of the linear combination, we define a notion of admissible controls and prove sufficient
conditions of optimality, see Proposition 36 and Corollary 39. The connection between equilibria in
the open-loop and the closed-loop information structures are studied in Section 6, see Lemma 42 and
Remark 43. Focusing on closed-loop controls, expressions for the gradient of the utility function and a
necessary condition of optimality are derived in Section 7, and both model-based and model-free policy
optimization methods are proposed. In Subsection 7.4, we report numerical experiments to show the
convergence of the controls and the utility function. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we first present a zero-sum game in which two controllers compete to influence a
population of agents. The agents interact in a symmetric way, through the empirical distribution of
their states and actions. We then present a mean-field version of the game (corresponding to the
situation where N → +∞), in which the two controllers influence a state whose dynamics is of MKV
type.
2.1. N-agent problem. Consider a system composed of a population {1, . . . , N} with N indistinguish-
able agents. We investigate the case in which these agents have symmetric interactions and are influenced
by two decision makers, also called controllers or players, competing to optimize a criterion. In par-
ticular, we are interested in the linear-quadratic zero-sum case. Here, the state evolution of an agent
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is given by
(1) xit+1 = Ax
i
t + A¯x¯t + B1u
i
1,t + B¯1u¯1,t + B2u
i
2,t + B¯2u¯2,t + 
i
t+1 + 
0
t+1,
with initial condition xi0 = i0+00, where xi0 is the initial state of agent i to which we introduce randomness
with i0 and 00. At each time t, xit ∈ Rd corresponds to the state of the i-th agent in the population,
and ui1,t ∈ R` and ui2,t ∈ R` are the controls prescribed to this agent respectively by the first and the
second decision maker. The noise terms 0t+1 and it+1 are independent of each other and of 00 and i0.
Moreover, the noise terms 0t+1 for t ≥ 0 are assumed to be identically distributed with mean 0, and
similarly for it+1 for t ≥ 0. The interpretation of the noise terms is that 0t is a common noise affecting
the position of all the agents, whereas it is an indiosyncratic noise affecting only the position of the i-th
agent. A, A¯,Bi, B¯i are fixed matrices with suitable dimensions. Here, x¯t = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
i
t, is the sample
average of the individual states, and similarly for u1 and u2: u¯j,t = 1N
∑N
i=1 u
i
j,t. The instantaneous
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utility is defined by
(2)
c(x, x¯,u1, u¯1, u2, u¯2) = (x− x¯)>Q(x− x¯) + x¯>(Q+ Q¯)x¯
+ (u1 − u¯1)>R1(u1 − u¯1) + u¯>1 + (R1 + R¯1)u¯1
− (u2 − u¯2)>R2(u2 − u¯2)− u¯>2 (R2 + R¯2)u¯2,
where Q, Q¯,Ri, R¯i are deterministic symmetric matrices of suitable sizes such that Ri, Ri+R¯i for i = 1, 2
are positive definite.
The objective of each controller in this zero-sum problem is to minimize (resp. maximize) the N -agent
utility functional
JN (u1,u2) = E
[
+∞∑
t=0
γtc¯N (xt, u1,t, u2,t)
]
,
where xt = (x1t , . . . , xNt ), and ui = (ui,t)t with ui,t = (u1i,t, . . . , u
N
i,t) (we use a boldface to denote a
function of time and an underline to denote a vector of size N), and c¯N is the average utility, defined by
c¯N (xt, u1,t, u2,t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
c(xit, x¯t, u
i
1,t, u¯1,t, u
i
2,t, u¯2,t).
The minimax problem is defined as follows,
(3) inf
u1
sup
u2
JN (u1,u2).
This problem is a generalization of the mean-field control setup, in which there is a single decision
maker. It can also be viewed as a variant of Nash mean-field control setup studied in [16] or mean-field
type games [32] in which several mean-field decision makers compete in a general-sum game.
Remark 1. An interesting special case is the situation in which each decision maker controls a different
population. This corresponds to a zero-sum game between two large coalitions. This setting can be
covered in the following way. Assume that d = 2d′ for some integer d′. Consider, for the dynamics,
block matrices of the form:
A =
(
A1 0
0 A2
)
, B1 =
(
B11
0
)
, B2 =
(
0
B22
)
,
and
A¯ =
(
A¯11 A¯12
A¯21 A¯22
)
, B¯1 =
(
B¯11
B¯21
)
, B¯2 =
(
B¯12
B¯22
)
.
Then the dynamics (1) rewrites, with the notation x = (x1, x2) where xi ∈ Rd′ and similarly for 0, i,
dxi1,t =
[
A1x
i
1,t + A¯11x¯1,t + A¯12x¯2,t +B
1
1u
i
1,t + B¯
1
1 u¯1,t + B¯
2
1 u¯2,t
]
+ i1,t + 
0
1,t,
dxi2,t =
[
A2x
i
2,t + A¯21x¯1,t + A¯22x¯2,t +B
2
2u
i
2,t + B¯
2
1 u¯1,t + B¯
2
2 u¯2,t
]
+ i2,t + 
0
2,t.
Note that the evolution of the two halves of vector x are coupled only through their expectations and
the expectation of the control used for the other half. We can thus interpret each half as the state of a
player in a different population where each population has N indistinguishable agents.
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2.2. Mean-field problem. Here, we consider the limit of the N -agent case. The dynamics is given by
(4) xt+1 = Axt + A¯x¯t + B1u1,t + B¯1u¯1,t + B2u2,t + B¯2u¯2,t + 0t+1 + 
1
t+1,
with initial condition
x0 = 
0
0 + 
1
0.
Here and thereafter, when considering the mean-field problem, we use the notation x¯t = E[xt|(0s)0≤s≤t]
for the expectation of the state conditional on the realization of the common noise, and likewise for u1
and u2. Note that (4) is a dynamics of MKV type since it is influenced by its own distribution and by
the distribution of the actions. The utility function takes the form
(5) J(u1,u2) = E
[
+∞∑
t=0
γtct
]
,
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor, and the instantaneous utility at time t is defined as
ct = c(xt, x¯t, u1,t, u¯1,t, u2,t, u¯2,t),(6)
where the function c is as in the N -agent problem.
The goal is to find a Nash equilibrium, namely a pair of (u∗1,u∗2) such that
J(u∗1,u
∗
2) = infu1
sup
u2
J(u1,u2).(7)
Next, we study the existence of the Nash equilibrium and derive its closed-form expression for the
formulated ZSMFTG.
3. Probabilistic setup
In this section we rigorously define the model of MKV dynamics with common noise. It is analogous
to the one considered in [28], except for the fact that there are two decision makers instead of one.
A convenient way to think about this model is to view the state xt of the system at time t as a
random variable defined on the probability space (Ω,F ,P) where Ω = Ω0 × Ω1, F = F0 × F1 and
P = P0 × P1. In this set-up, if ω = (ω0, ω1), 0t (ω) = ˜0t (ω0) and 1t (ω) = ˜1t (ω1) where (˜0t )t=1,2,...
and (˜1t )t=1,2,... are i.i.d. sequences of mean-zero random variables on (Ω0,F0,P0) and (Ω1,F1,P1)
respectively, while the initial sources of randomness ˜00 and ˜10 are random variables on (Ω0,F0,P0)
and (Ω1,F1,P1) with distributions µ00 and µ10 respectively, which are independent of each other and
independent of (˜0t )t=1,2,... and (˜1t )t=1,2,.... We denote by Ft the filtration generated by the noise up until
time t, that is Ft = σ(00, 10, 01, 11, . . . , 0t , 1t ). We assume that the variance of random variables 0t and
1t are constant along time, and these variances are denoted by Σ0 = E[(0t )>0t ] and Σ1 = E[(1t )>1t ] for
every t ≥ 1.
At each time t ≥ 0, xt and ui,t with i = 1, 2 are random elements defined on (Ω,F ,P) representing
the state of the system and the controls exerted by a pair of generic agents. Using the fact that the
idiosyncratic noise and the common noise are independent, the quantities x¯t and u¯i,t with i = 1, 2
appearing in (4) are random variables on (Ω,F ,P) defined by: for ω = (ω0, ω1),
x¯t(ω
0, ω1) =
∫
Ω1
xt(ω
0, ω˜1)P1(dω˜1), u¯i,t(ω0, ω1) =
∫
Ω1
ui,t(ω
0, ω˜1)P1(dω˜1), i = 1, 2.
Notice that x¯t, u¯1,t and u¯2,t depend only upon ω0. In fact, the best way to think of x¯t and u¯i,t with
i = 1, 2 is to keep in mind the following fact:
x¯t = E[xt|F0], and u¯i,t = E[ui,t|F0].
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These are the mean field terms appearing in the (stochastic) dynamics of the state (4):
xt+1 = Axt + A¯x¯t +B1u1,t + B¯1u¯1,t +B2u2,t + B¯2u¯2,t + 
0
t+1 + 
1
t+1.
4. Open-loop information structure
In this section, we consider open-loop controls, that is, controls available if the controllers can directly
see the noise terms. We start with this class of controls because it is somehow “larger” than the class of
closed-loop controls that will be considered in the next section (any closed-loop control gives rise to an
open-loop control, but the converse is not always true). The main point of this section is to show that,
under suitable conditions, the Nash equilibrium controls in the open-loop setting can in fact be written
as linear combinations of the state and the conditional mean.
4.1. Admissible controls. We introduce the following sets: for T ≥ 0,
UT :=
{
u : {0, . . . , T} × Ω 7→ R` | ut is Ft −measurable, E
[
sup
t=0,...,T
γt‖ut‖2
]
<∞
}
,
Uloc :=
⋃
T≥0
UT , U :=
{
u : N× Ω 7→ R`
∣∣∣∣∣ u ∈ Uloc, E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt‖ut‖2
]
<∞
}
,
where we use the notation ut(·) = u(t, ·) for every t ∈ N and we identify u to an F-adapted process
(ut)t≥0. A process u is called L2−discounted globally integrable, or L2−integrable for short, if u ∈ U .
Also, for T ≥ 0,
XT :=
{
x : {0, . . . , T} × Ω 7→ Rd | xt is Ft −measurable, E
[
sup
t=0,...,T
γt‖xt‖2
]
<∞
}
,
Xloc :=
⋃
T≥0
XT , X :=
{
x ∈ N× Ω 7→ Rd
∣∣∣∣∣ u ∈ Xloc, E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt‖xt‖2
]
<∞
}
.
Similarly, we identify x ∈ Xloc or x ∈ X to an F−adapted process (xt)t≥0 in Rd. We also call a state
process is L2−discounted globally integrable, or simply L2−integrable, if x ∈ X . Let Sd stand for the
set of symmetric matrices in Rd×d.
In the open-loop information structure, we consider the following subset of U × U :
Uopenad :=
{
(u1,u2) ∈ U × U | (xu,u2t )t≥0 ∈ X
}
where the state process (xu1,u2t )x≥0 follows the dynamics (4). We call every element (u1,u2) ∈ Uopenad an
admissible (open-loop) control pair for the two players.
We collect here a few useful results, stated without proof for the sake of brevity.
The following proposition is about the L2-integrability of the state processes.
Proposition 2. We consider a state processes X = (Xt)t≥0 following the dynamics
(8) Xt+1 = AXt + qt +Wt+1, X0 ∼ µ0
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where A ∈ Rd×d, q = (qt)t≥0 ∈ U , and µ0 ∈ P2(Rd) such that E[X0] = 0 and E[‖X0‖2] < ∞. Assume
the noise process (Wt)t≥1 satisfies E[WiWj ] = 0 for 1 ≤ i < j <∞, E[Wt] = 0 for every t ≥ 1, and also
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
γt‖Wt‖2
]
<∞.
Assume that the matrix A satisfies γ‖A‖2 < 1. Then the state process X = (Xt)t≥0 is in X , i.e.
E
[∑∞
t=0 γ
t‖Xt‖2
]
<∞.
The following result gives a link with L2−asymptotical stability.
Lemma 3. If x ∈ X , then we have limt→∞ E[γt‖xt‖2] = 0.
We have the following two lemmas related to the L2−discounted globally integrability for processes
(xt − x¯t)t≥0 and (x¯t)t≥0.
Lemma 4. A process x ∈ X if and only if both processes (xt − x¯t)t≥0 ∈ X and (x¯t)t≥0 ∈ X . Similarly,
a control process u ∈ U if and only if both processes (ut − u¯t)t≥0 ∈ U and (u¯t)t≥0 ∈ U .
Using Proposition 2 and Lemma 4, we deduce the following result.
Lemma 5. For any given (u1,u2) ∈ U × U , let (q(y)t )t≥0 and (q(z)t )t≥0 be two processes in U given by:
for every t ≥ 0,
(9)
 q
(y)
t = B1(u1,t − u¯1,t) +B2(u2,t − u¯2,t),
q
(z)
t = (B1 + B¯1)u¯1,t + (B2 + B¯2)u¯2,t.
We have:
• if γ‖A‖2 < 1, then the state process y = (yt)t≥0 following the dynamics
(10) yt+1 = Ayt + q
(y)
t + 
1
t+1, y0 ∼ µ10
is L2−discounted globally integrable, i.e. E [∑∞t=0 γt‖yt‖2] <∞;
• if γ‖A+ A¯‖2 < 1, the state process z = (zt)t≥0 following the dynamics
(11) zt+1 = (A+ A¯)zt + q
(z)
t + 
0
t+1, z0 ∼ µ00
is L2−discounted globally integrable, i.e. E [∑∞t=0 γt‖zt‖2] <∞.
Now, we are ready to provide the L2−discounted global integrability for the state process xu1,u2 =
(xu1,u2t )t≥0 following dynamics (4) controlled by two processes u1,u2 ∈ U .
Assumption 1. γ‖A‖2 < 1 and γ‖A+ A¯‖2 < 1.
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1, we have Uopenad = U × U . In particular, the set of admissible
controls Uopenad is convex.
Proof. By definition, Uopenad ⊆ U × U . For the other inclusion, let us consider a pair of control processes
(u1,u2) ∈ U × U . We know that the corresponding state process xu1,u2 ∈ Xloc. Taking the conditional
expectation with respect to F0 and denoting x¯u1,u2t = E[xu1,u2t |F0], we notice that, for every t ≥ 0,x
u1,u2
t − x¯u1,u2t = A(xu1,u2t − x¯u1,u2t ) + q(y)t + 1t+1
x¯u1,u2t = (A+ A¯)x¯
u1,u2
t + q
(z)
t + 
0
t+1
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where q(y)t and q
(z)
t are given by (9). Let us denote yt = x
u1,u2
t − x¯u1,u2t and zt = x¯u1,u2t for every
t ≥ 0. Under Assumption 1, by Lemma 5, we obtain that the processes (yt)t≥0 ∈ X and (zt)t≥0 ∈ X .
which implies xu1,u2 ∈ X . Thus, U × U ⊆ Uopenad . The convexity of Uopenad is a direct consequence of the
convexity of U . 
Remark 7. In the closed-loop information structure (c.f. Section 5), we will see that the set of closed-
loop admissible policy is not convex.
Definition 8. A pair of admissible control processes (u∗1,u∗2) ∈ Uopenad is an open-loop Nash equilibrium
(or open-loop saddle point, OLSP for short) for the zero-sum game if for any process u′1 ∈ U and u′2 ∈ U ,
we have
(12) J(u∗1,u
′
2) ≤ J(u∗1,u∗2) ≤ J(u′1,u∗2),
where (u1,u2) 7→ J(u1,u2) is the utility function defined in equation (5).
4.2. Equilibrium condition. For the sake of convenience, we use the notation Aˇ = A − Id where Id
denotes the d× d identity matrix, and ζ = (x, x¯, u1, u¯1, u2, u¯2), so that, if we define the function b by:
(13) b(ζ) = b(x, x¯, u1, u¯1, u2, u¯2) = Aˇx+ A¯x¯+B1u1 + B¯1u¯1 +B2u2 + B¯2u¯2.
The state equation (4) can be rewritten as:
(14) xt+1 − xt = b(xt, x¯t, u1,t, u¯1,t, u2,t, u¯2,t) + 0t+1 + 1t+1 = b(ζt) + 0t+1 + 1t+1.
We define the Hamiltonian function h by:
h(ζ, p)
= h(x, x¯, u1, u¯1, u2, u¯2, η)
= [Aˇx+ A¯x¯+B1u1 + B¯1u¯1 +B2u2 + B¯2u¯2] · p+ c(x, x¯, u1, u¯1, u2, u¯2)− δx · p
= b(ζ) · p+ c(ζ)− δx · p
(15)
for p ∈ Rd, where δ = (1 − γ)/γ is a positive constant representing the discount rate, γ ∈ [0, 1] being
the discount factor. Throughout, we use the notation · for the scalar product in Euclidean space. We
will use the following property of the Hamiltonian, under the following assumption, where  0 (resp.
) means that the matrix is non-negative semi definite (resp. positive definite).
Lemma 9. If R1  0, R1 + R¯1  0 (resp. R2  0, and R2 + R¯2  0), the function h is convex w.r.t.
(u1, u¯1) (resp. concave w.r.t. (u2, u¯2)). It is strictly convex (resp. strictly concave) if R1  0 and
(R1 + R¯1)  0 (resp. R2  0 and (R2 + R¯2)  0).
Proof. For the purpose of computing gradients, Hessians and partial derivatives, we treat ζ as a (2d +
4`)× 1 column vector by specifying its definition as ζ = [x>, x¯>, u>1 , u¯>1 , u>2 , u¯>2 ]>. Now, for every fixed
p ∈ Rd, we have:
(16) ∇ζh(ζ, p) =

∂xh(ζ, p)
∂x¯h(ζ, p)
∂u1h(ζ, p)
∂u¯1h(ζ, p)
∂u2h(ζ, p)
∂u¯2h(ζ, p)
 =

p>(Aˇ− δId) + 2(x− x¯)>Q
p>A¯+ 2(x¯− x)>Q+ 2x¯>(Q+ Q¯)
p>B1 + 2(u1 − u¯1)>R1
p>B¯1 + 2(u¯1 − u1)>R1 + 2u¯>1 (R1 + R¯1)
p>B2 − 2(u2 − u¯2)>R2
p>B¯2 − 2(u¯2 − u2)>R2 − 2u¯>2 (R2 + R¯2).

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It can be seen that
∇2(u1,u¯1),(u1,u¯1)h(ζ, p) =
(
2R1 −2R1
−2R1 2(2R1 + R¯1)
)
,
is non-negative definite if the inequalities R1  0 and R1 + R¯1  0 are satisfied, and positive definite if
R1  0 and (R1 + R¯1)  0. Likewise for the second order derivatives w.r.t. (u2, u¯2). 
In the spirit of the analysis of the stochastic version of the Pontryagin maximum principle, we introduce
the notion of adjoint process associated to a given admissible pair of control processes.
Definition 10. If ui = (ui,t)t=0,1,..., i = 1, 2 is a pair of admissible control processes and x = (xt)t=0,1,...
is the corresponding state process, we say that an Rd-valued (Ft)t≥0-adapted process p = (pt)t=0,1,... is
an adjoint process if it satisfies:
(17) pt = E
[
pt+1 + γ
[
(Aˇ> − δId)pt+1 + 2Qxt+1 + A¯>p¯t+1 + 2Q¯x¯t+1
]|Ft], t = 0, 1, . . . .
It will be useful to note that the above expression can equivalently be written as:
(18) pt = γE[A>pt+1 + 2Qxt+1 + A¯>p¯t+1 + 2Q¯x¯t+1 | Ft].
Using this notion, we can express the derivative of the function J as follows.
Lemma 11. The Gateaux derivative of J at (u1,u2) in the direction (β1,β2) ∈ U × U exists and is
given by
DJ(u1,u2)(β1,β2) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t B1 + 2u
>
1,tR1 + p¯
>
t B¯1 + 2u¯
>
1,tR¯1
)
β1,t
]
+ E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t B2 − 2u>2,tR2 + p¯>t B¯2 − 2u¯>2,tR¯2
)
β2,t
]
.
(19)
Proof. We start by computing the difference between the values of J evaluated on two pairs of controls.
Let ui = (ui,t)t=0,1,... and u′i = (u
′
i,t)t=0,1,..., i = 1, 2 be two pairs of admissible control processes and let
us denote by xt and x′t the corresponding states of the system at time t, as given by the state equation (4)
with the same initial point and the same realizations of the noise sequences (0t )t=0,1,... and (1t )t=0,1,....
Note that as a consequence:
xt+1 − x′t+1 = xt − x′t + Aˇ(xt − x′t) + A¯(x¯t − x¯′t) +
∑
i=1,2
[
Bi(ui,t − u′i,t) + B¯i(u¯i,t − u¯′i,t)
]
,
which shows that xt+1 − x′t+1 is in fact Ft-measurable. As before, we use the convenient notations ζt =
(xt, x¯t, u1,t, u¯1,t, u2,t, u¯2,t) and ζ ′t = (x′t, x¯′t, u′1,t, u¯′1,t, u′2,t, u¯′2,t). In order to estimate J(u′1,u′2)− J(u1,u2)
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we first notice that, if p = (pt)t=0,1,... is any sequence of real valued random variables, then:
∞∑
t=0
γt[c(ζ ′t)− c(ζt)] =
∞∑
t=0
γt
[
c(ζ ′t)− c(ζt) + [b(ζ ′t)− b(ζt)] · pt − δ(x′t − xt) · pt
− [b(ζ ′t)− b(ζt)] · pt + δ(x′t − xt) · pt
]
=
∞∑
t=0
γt
[
h(ζ ′t, pt)− h(ζt, pt)
]− ∞∑
t=0
γt[(x′t+1 − xt+1)− (x′t − xt)] · pt
+ δ
∞∑
t=0
γt(x′t − xt) · pt
=
∞∑
t=0
γt
[
h(ζ ′t, pt)− h(ζt, pt)
]
+
∞∑
t=0
γt(x′t+1 − xt+1) · (pt+1 − pt)
(20)
where we used the fact that δ = (1− γ)/γ.
We now turn to computing the Gateaux derivative of J . Let ui,βi, i = 1, 2, as in the statement. To
alleviate the notation, we denote
Vt = lim
→0
1

(
x
u1+β1,u2+β2
t − xu1,u2t
)
,
where xu1+β1,u2+β2 is the state process controlled by (u1 + β1,u2 + β2) ∈ Uopenad , and xu1,u2 is the
state process controlled by (u1,u2) ∈ Uopenad . Let (u′1,u′2) = (u1 + β1,u2 + β2).
We then compute, using the expressions of the partial derivatives of h already computed in the proof
of Lemma 9
DJ(u1,u2)(β1,β2) = lim
→0
1

[J(u1 + β1,u2 + β2)− J(u1,u2)]
=
∞∑
t=0
E
[
γtVt+1 · (pt+1 − pt)
]
+
∞∑
t=0
γtE
[
∂xh(ζt, pt)Vt + ∂x¯h(ζt, pt)V¯t
+ ∂u1h(ζt, pt)β1,t + ∂u¯1h(ζt, pt)β¯1,t + ∂u2h(ζt, pt)β2,t + ∂u¯2h(ζt, pt)β¯2,t
]
=
∞∑
t=0
γtE
[
Vt+1 · (pt+1 − pt)
+
(
p>t (Aˇ− δId) + 2(xt − x¯t)>Q
)
Vt +
(
p>t A¯+ 2(x¯t − xt)>Q+ 2x¯>t (Q+ Q¯)
)
V¯t
+
(
p>t B1 + 2(u1,t − u¯1,t)>R1
)
β1,t +
(
p>t B¯1 + 2(u¯1,t − u1,t)>R1 + 2u¯>1,t(R1 + R¯1)
)
β¯1,t
+
(
p>t B2 − 2(u2,t − u¯2,t)>R2
)
β2,t +
(
p>t B¯2 − 2(u¯2,t − u2,t)>R2 − 2u¯>2,t(R2 + R¯2)
)
β¯2,t
]
=
∞∑
t=0
γtE
[
(0) + (i) + (ii) + (iii)1 + (iv)1 + (iii)2 + (iv)2
]
.
(21)
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We now use Fubini’s theorem to compute two of the six terms above. Recall that V¯t = E[Vt|F0], which
we choose to express in the form
V¯t = E˜[V˜t|F0] =
∫
Ω˜1
V˜t(ω
0, ω˜1)P˜1(dω˜1),
where (Ω˜1, F˜1, P˜1) is an identical copy of (Ω1,F1,P1) and the probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) is defined as
Ω˜ = Ω0× Ω˜1, F˜ = F0×F˜1,and P˜ = P0× P˜1. For the sake of ease of notation, we introduce still another
notation for the conditional expectations: we shall denote by EF0 and E˜F0 the conditional expectations
usually denoted by E[ · |F0] and E˜[ · |F0] respectively. With this new notation x¯t = EF0 [xt] = E˜F0 [x˜t] =
x˜t and similarly for the other random variables. Consequently:
E
∞∑
t=0
γt(ii) = EEF0
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t A¯+ 2(x¯t − xt)>Q+ 2x¯>t (Q+ Q¯)
)
V¯t
= EEF0E˜F0
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t A¯+ 2(x¯t − xt)>Q+ 2x¯>t (Q+ Q¯)
)
V˜t
= E
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p¯>t A¯+ 2x¯
>
t (Q+ Q¯)
)
Vt,
where we used Fubini’s theorem for the last equality. So:
E
∞∑
t=0
γt[(i) + (ii)] = E
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t (Aˇ− δId) + 2(xt − x¯t)>Q+ p¯>t A¯+ 2x¯>t (Q+ Q¯)
)
Vt
= E
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t (Aˇ− δId) + 2x>t Q+ p¯>t A¯+ 2x¯>t Q¯
)
Vt.
(22)
As a consequence,
∞∑
t=0
γtE
[
(0) + (i) + (ii)
]
= 0
because of (22) and the definition (17) of the adjoint process.
Furthermore, using Fubini’s theorem on an identical copy of u1 and β1 we get:
E
∞∑
t=0
γt[(iii)1 + (iv)1] = E
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t B1 + 2u
>
1,tR1 + p¯
>
t B¯1 + 2u¯
>
1,tR¯1
)
β1,t,(23)
and likewise for u2,β2.

We are now in a position to prove the following condition for optimality:
Proposition 12 (Pontryagin’s maximum principle, necessary condition). Assuming that Assumption 1
holds, if ui = (ui,t)t=0,1,..., i = 1, 2 is a pair of admissible control processes such that it is an open-loop
Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game and p = (pt)t=0,1,... is the corresponding adjoint process, then it
holds
(24)
{
B>1 pt + 2R1u1,t + B¯>1 p¯t + 2R¯1u¯1,t = 0
B>2 pt − 2R2u2,t + B¯>2 p¯t − 2R¯2u¯2,t = 0
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for all t ≥ 0, P-almost surely.
Proof. By Lemma 11, for any pair of processes (β1,β2) ∈ U × U we have the
DJ(u1,u2)(β1,β2) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t B1 + 2u
>
1,tR1 + p¯
>
t B¯1 + 2u¯
>
1,tR¯1
)
β1,t
]
+ E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t B2 − 2u>2,tR2 + p¯>t B¯2 − 2u¯>2,tR¯2
)
β2,t
]
.
Since (u1,u2) ∈ Uopenad is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game, then for every u′1 ∈ U
and u′2 ∈ U , we have
J(u1,u
′
2) ≤ J(u1,u2) ≤ J(u′1,u2).
Let us denote the state processes in the above inequalities by Xu1,u
′
2 ,Xu1,u2 ,Xu
′
1,u2 , which are all
L2−discounted globally integrable according to Proposition 2.
If we choose β2 = 0, then for every β1 ∈ U ,
DJ(u1,u2)(β1, 0) = lim
→0
1

[J(u1 + β1,u2)− J(u1,u2)] ≥ 0
which implies,
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
p>t B1 + 2u
>
1,tR1 + p¯
>
t B¯1 + 2u¯
>
1,tR¯1
)
β1,t
]
≥ 0.
Thus, the corresponding adjoint process p satisfies: P−almost surely, for every t ≥ 0,
B>1 pt + 2R1u1,t + B¯
>
1 p¯t + 2R¯1u¯1,t = 0.
Similarly, we have B>2 pt − 2R2u2,t + B¯>2 p¯t − 2R¯2u¯2,t = 0 for every t ≥ 0, P-almost surely. 
4.3. Identification of the equilibrium. Let us introduce the notations
(25)
{
Γi = (−1)i 12R−1i B>i , Ξi = (−1)i 12R−1i
[
B¯>i − R¯i(Ri + R¯i)−1(Bi + B¯i)>
]
,
Λi = Γi + Ξi = (−1)i 12(Ri + R¯i)−1(Bi + B¯i)>, i = 1, 2.
We then consider the following Riccati equations:
(26) γ[A>P + 2Q]
(
A+
(
B1Γ1 +B2Γ2
)
P
)
= P,
and
(27) γ
[
(A> + A¯>)P¯ + 2(Q+ Q¯)
] [
(A+ A¯) +
(
(B1 + B¯1)Λ1 + (B2 + B¯2)Λ2
)
P¯
]
= P¯ .
We shall assume that there exists solutions P, P¯ ∈ Sd to these equations, which can be proved under
suitable conditions. (for example, by contraction arguments with “small coefficients" of the problem.)
We also discuss in section 6 a way to construct P and P¯ with the help of other Algebraic Riccati
equations.
Proposition 13. Assume there exists P, P¯ solving (26)–(27). The following pair of controls satisfies
the equilibrium condition (24):
(28) ui,t = ΓiP (xt − x¯t) + ΛiP¯ x¯t,
where xt is controlled by ui,t, i = 1, 2 and x¯t = EF0 [xt].
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Moreover, the process p = (pt)t≥0 defined by:
(29) pt = P (xt − x¯t) + P¯ x¯t, t ≥ 0,
is an adjoint process satisfying (17).
Proof. Let Z0 and Z1 be the processes defined by
Z0t = γ[(A
> + A¯>)P¯ + 2(Q+ Q¯)], Z1t = γ[A
>P + 2Q].
Notice that such processes are deterministic (hence predictable) and independent of time.
Let us consider a process p satisfying
(30) pt+1 − pt = −γ
[
(Aˇ> − δId)pt+1 + 2Qxt+1 + A¯>p¯t+1 + 2Q¯x¯t+1
]
+ Z0t+1
0
t+1 + Z
1
t+1
1
t+1.
Then, p also satisfies (17) so it is an adjoint process.
We now rewrite the equilibrium condition (24). Taking conditional expectations EF0 in the first
equation, we get:
(B1 + B¯1)
>p¯t + 2(R1 + R¯1)u¯1,t = 0
from which we derive:
(31) u¯1,t = −1
2
(R1 + R¯1)
−1(B1 + B¯1)>p¯t.
Plugging this expression back into the first equation of (24) we get:
B>1 pt + 2R1u1,t + B¯
>
1 p¯t − R¯1(R1 + R¯1)−1(B1 + B¯1)>p¯t = 0
from which we deduce:
(32) u1,t = Γ1pt + Ξ1p¯t, and u¯1,t = Λ1p¯t
for Γ1,Ξ1,Λ1 introduced in (25). Similarly, we find
(33) u2,t = Γ2pt + Ξ2p¯t, and u¯2,t = Λ2p¯t.
Plugging expressions (32), (33) for u1,t, u2,t and u¯1,t, u¯2,t into the state dynamics equation (4) and
the definition (30) of the adjoint process we find that at the equilibrium, the system should satisfy, for
t = 0, 1, . . .,
(34)

xt+1 − xt = Aˇxt + A¯x¯t + (B1Γ1 +B2Γ2)pt
+(B¯1Λ1 +B1Ξ1 + B¯2Λ2 +B2Ξ2)p¯t + 
0
t+1 + 
1
t+1,
pt+1 − pt = −γ
[
(Aˇ> − δId)pt+1 + 2Qxt+1 + A¯>p¯t+1 + 2Q¯x¯t+1
]
+ Z0t+1
0
t+1
+Z1t+1
1
t+1.
Taking conditional expectations EF0 on all sides we get: for t = 0, 1, . . .
(35)
{
x¯t+1 − x¯t = (Aˇ+ A¯)x¯t +
[
(B1 + B¯1)Λ1 + (B2 + B¯2)Λ2
]
p¯t + 
0
t+1,
p¯t+1 − p¯t = −γ[(Aˇ> + A¯> − δId)p¯t+1 + 2(Q+ Q¯)x¯t+1] + Z0t+10t+1,
which is a linear forward-backward stochastic difference equation in infinite horizon on the probability
space (Ω0,F0,P0) of the common noise.
Using the solutions P, P¯ solving (26)–(27), let us define
pt = P (xt − x¯t) + P¯ x¯t.
We now check the pair of process (xt, pt)t≥0 provides a solution to (34), so that (pt)t≥0 given by
equation (29) is an adjoint process.
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First, from our choice of Z0 and using the fact that P¯ solves (27), there holds: for t = 0, 1, . . .{
x¯t+1 =
[
(A+ A¯) +
[
(B1 + B¯1)Λ1 + (B2 + B¯2)Λ2
]
P¯
]
x¯t + 
0
t+1,
γ
[
(A> + A¯>)P¯ + 2(Q+ Q¯)
]
x¯t+1 = P¯ x¯t + Z
0
t+1
0
t+1,
or equivalently{
x¯t+1 − x¯t =
[
(Aˇ+ A¯) +
[
(B1 + B¯1)Λ1 + (B2 + B¯2)Λ2
]
P¯
]
x¯t + 
0
t+1,
P¯ (x¯t+1 − x¯t) = −γ
[
(Aˇ> + A¯> − δId)P¯ + 2(Q+ Q¯)
]
x¯t+1 + Z
0
t+1
0
t+1.
Combining with p¯t = P¯ x¯t, we deduce that (35) is satisfied.
We proceed similarly for the other equation.

4.4. A Convexity-concavity sufficient condition. Consider two deterministic processes V1 =
(V1,t)t≥0 and V2 = (V2,t)t≥0 following the dynamics
(36a)
(36b)
{
V1,t+1 = AV1,t + A¯V¯1,t +B1β1,t + B¯1β¯1,t, V1,t=0 = 0,
V2,t+1 = AV2,t + A¯V¯2,t +B2β2,t + B¯2β¯2,t, V2,t=0 = 0,
where (β1,β2) ∈ U × U are two L2−integrable control processes. Under Assumption 1, by Lemma 4,
we have V1 ∈ X and V2 ∈ X .
Proposition 14 (Pontryagin’s maximum principle, sufficient condition). We assume the following con-
ditions:
(1) There exists a state process x = (xt)t≥0 and its adjoint processes (p,Z0,Z1) = (pt, Z0t , Z1t )t≥0
such that x,p are (Ft)t≥0-adapted and (Z0t , Z1t )t≥1 are (Ft)t≥0-predictable processes, and they
satisfy the forward-backward system of equations: for every t ≥ 0,
(37)

xt+1 = Axt + A¯x¯t + (B1Γ1 +B2Γ2)pt
+
(
(B1 + B¯1)Λ1 + (B2 + B¯2)Λ2 −B1Γ1 −B2Γ2
)
p¯t + 
0
t+1 + 
1
t+1,
pt = γ
(
A>pt+1 + 2Qxt+1 + A¯>p¯t+1 + 2Q¯x¯t+1
)
+ Z0t+1
0
t+1 + Z
1
t+1
1
t+1
with initial values x0 = 00 + 
1
0 and Z
0
0 = Z
1
0 = 0.
(2) For any control processes (β1,β2) ∈ U × U , we have the following convexity-concavity condition
for the zero-sum game:
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
V >1,tQV1,t + V¯
>
1,tQ¯V¯1,t + β
>
1,tR1β1,t + β¯
>
1,tR¯1β¯1,t
)]
≥ 0(38)
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
V >2,tQV2,t + V¯
>
2,tQ¯V¯2,t − β>2,tR2β2,t − β¯>2,tR¯2β¯2,t
)]
≤ 0(39)
where the processes (V1,V2) ∈ X × X follows the dynamics defined in (36a) and (36b).
Then, the pair of control processes (u1,u2) ∈ Uopenad given by:
(40) ui,t = Γipt + (Λi − Γi)p¯t, i = 1, 2
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game. Moreover, (u1,u2) satisfies the equilibrium
condition (24) of the Pontryagin maximum principle.
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Proof. The backward equation for process p implies that it satisfies the conditional expectation condition
(17). In the proof of Proposition 13, we show with equations (32)–(33) that the pair of control processes
(u1,u2) defined by equation (40) satisfies the equilibrium condition (24). By substituting the right hand
side of (40) with (u1,t, u2,t) in the forward equation for (xt)t≥0 in (37), we get that the process x follows
dynamics (4) which is controlled exactly by (u1,u2) ∈ Uopenad .
Based on the proof of Lemma 11 for the Gateaux derivative of J , we write a second-order expansion
for the value function J at a point (u1,u2) ∈ Uopenad in the direction (β1,β2) ∈ U × U . To alleviate the
notation, we introduce a deterministic process V = (Vt)t≥0 following a dynamics
Vt+1 = AVt + A¯V¯t +B1β1 + B¯1β¯1 +B2β2 + B¯2β2
with initial value V0 = 0. The linearity of the dynamics (4) shows that Vt = (x
u1+β1,u2+β2
t − xu1,u2t )/
for every  > 0 and t ≥ 0. According to equation (20), the difference between the values of J at point
(u1 + β1,u2 + β2) and at point (u1,u2) can be expressed by
(41)
J(u1 + β1,u2 + β2)− J(u1,u2)
=
( ∞∑
t=0
E
[
γtVt+1 · (pt+1 − pt)
]
+
∞∑
t=0
γtE
[∇ζh(ζt, pt) · ζˇt]
)
+
1
2
2
∞∑
t=0
γtE
[
∇2ζζh(ηt, pt)ζˇt · ζˇt
]
=(i) + 2(ii)
where ζˇt = (ζ ′t − ζt)/ =
[
V >t , V¯ >t , β>1,t, β¯>1,t, β>2,t, β¯>2,t
]> ∈ R2d×4` and ηt = (1 − λt)ζ ′t + λtζt ∈ R2d+4`
for some λt ∈ [0, 1]. Since we assume that the pair of admissible control processes (u1,u2) satisfies
the system of equations (24) at every time t ≥ 0, then by applying Lemma 11, we have (i) = 0. We
also notice that the Hessian of the Hamiltonian function h(·) with respect to ζ is a constant matrix
depending only on model parameters. Thus, we obtain
(42)
(ii) =
∞∑
t=0
γtE
[
V >t QVt + V¯
>
t (¯2Q+ Q¯)V¯t − V >t QV¯t − V¯ >t QVt + β>1,tR1β1,t
+ β¯>1,t(2R1 + R¯1)β¯1,t − β>1,tR1β¯1,t − β¯>1,tR1β1,t − β>2,tR2β2,t
− β¯>2,t(2R2 + R¯2)β¯2,t + β>2,tR2β¯2,t + β¯>2,tR2β2,t
]
=
∞∑
t=0
γtE
[
V >t QVt + V¯
>
t Q¯V¯t + β
>
1,tR1β1,t + β¯
>
1,tR¯1β¯1,t − β>2,tR2β2,t − β¯>2,tR¯2β¯2,t
]
.
Consider a fixed control process u2 for player 2. For every control process u′1 ∈ U , we choose
β1 = (u
′
1−u1)/ ∈ U and β2 = 0. The convexity condition (38), together with equations (41) and (42),
yield that
J(u1 + β1,u2)− J(u1,u2)
= 2E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
V >1,tQV1,t + V¯
>
1,tQ¯V¯1,t + β
>
1,tR1β1,t + β¯
>
1,tR¯1β¯1,t
)]
≥ 0,
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where the process V1 = (V1,t)t≥0 follows the dynamics (36a). Consequently, we have for every u′1 ∈ U ,
J(u′1,u2) ≥ J(u1,u2).
Similarly, the concavity condition (39) implies that, for every β2 ∈ U ,
J(u1,u2 + β2)− J(u1,u2)
= 2E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
V >2,tQV2,t + V¯
>
2,tQ¯V¯2,t − β>2,tR2β2,t − β¯>2,tR¯2β¯2,t
)]
≤ 0,
where V2 = (V2,t)t≥0 follows the dynamics (36b). Thus, with the same argument, we have for every
u′2 ∈ U , J(u1,u′2) ≤ J(u1,u2).
Therefore, we conclude that under the convexity-concavity condition for the two processes (V1,V2),
a pair of control processes (u1,u2) satisfying the system of equations (24) with adjoint process p is an
open-loop Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game. 
Remark 15. Assume that the convexity-concavity condition for the zero-sum game holds true under
a suitable choice of model parameters. If there exists a unique solution (x,p) to the forward-backward
system of equations (37), then by the necessary condition of the Pontryagin maximum principle proven
in Proposition 12, the open-loop Nash equilibrium given by (40) is the unique one. In this case, if
we suppose in addition that the Riccati equations (26)–(27) admit unique solutions P and P¯ , then by
Proposition 13 the adjoint process p must be a linear function of xt and x¯t defined by equation (29),
namely pt = P (xt − x¯t) + P¯ x¯t for every t ≥ 0.
Remark 16. We can see from equations (41) and (42) that the convexity-concavity condition is also a
necessary condition if (u1,u2) ∈ Uopenad is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game.
Taking a closer look at the convexity condition (38) (resp. the concavity condition (39)), it is indeed
a quadratic function of the process V1 (resp. V2) and the control β1 ∈ U (resp. β2 ∈ U). So, we can
apply results from the deterministic Linear-Quadratic control problems to derive a sufficient condition
for the convexity-concavity condition. Let us define some new value functions CVi(βi− β¯i) and C¯Vi(β¯i)
for i = 1, 2:
CVi(βi − β¯i) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
(Vi,t − V¯i,t)>
(
(−1)i−1Q
)
(Vi,t − V¯i,t)
+ (βi,t − β¯i,t)>Ri(βi,t − β¯i,t)
)]
,
C¯Vi(β¯i) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
V¯ >i,t
(
(−1)i−1(Q+ Q¯)
)
V¯i,t + β¯
>
i,t(Ri + R¯i)β¯i,t
)]
.
Then the convexity-concavity condition (38)–(39) is equivalent to
min
β1∈U
CV1(β1 − β¯1) + C¯V1(β¯1) ≥ 0, and min
β2∈U
CV2(β2 − β¯2) + C¯V2(β¯2) ≥ 0.
Here, we multiply Q and Q+ Q¯ by −1 for player i = 2 so that the concavity condition is connected to a
minimization problem. Let us assume that the following discrete Algebraic Riccati equation (DARE-i):
(43) 0 = (−1)i−1Q− Pi + γA>PiA− γ2A>PiBi
(
γB>i PiBi +Ri
)−1
B>i PiA,
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admits a symmetric matrix Pi ∈ Sd as solution satisfying γB>i PiBi + Ri  0 and γ‖A − BiKi‖2 < 1
where Ki = γ(γB>i PiBi+Ri)
−1B>i PiA. Then, by applying the Dynamically Programming principle and
the expression of optimal value function [41] starting at time t = 1 with an initial Vi,1 = Bi(βi,0 − β¯i,0),
the value CVi(βi − β¯i) can be expressed as:
min
βi
CVi(βi − β¯i) = min
βi,0=βˇi
E
[
min
βi:βi,0=βˇi
CVi(βi − β¯i)
]
= min
βˇi
E
[
(βˇi − ¯ˇβi)>
(
Ri + γB
>
i PiBi
)
(βˇi − ¯ˇβi)
]
≥ 0.
Existence of such a solution Pi can be guaranteed under suitable conditions, see [46] or Lemma 19
below. Moreover, for every given random variable βˇi, the value minβi:βi,0=βˇi CVi(βi − β¯i) is attained at
βi,t − β¯i,t = −Ki(Vi,t − V¯i,t) for t ≥ 1.
Similarly, if the discrete Algebraic Riccati equation for i = 1, 2 (DARE-MF-i):
0 = (−1)i−1(Q+ Q¯)− P¯i + γ(A+ A¯)>P¯i(A+ A¯)(44)
− γ2(A+ A¯)>P¯i(Bi + B¯i)
(
γ(Bi + B¯i)
>P¯i(Bi + B¯i)
+ (Ri + R¯i)
)−1
(Bi + B¯i)
>P¯i(A+ A¯).
has a solution P¯i such that γ(Bi + B¯i)>P¯i(Bi + B¯i) + (Ri + R¯i)  0 and γ‖A+ A¯− (Bi + B¯i)Li‖2 < 1
where Li = γ
(
γ(Bi + B¯i)
>P¯i(Bi + B¯i) + (Ri + R¯i)
)−1
(Bi + B¯i)
>P¯i(A + A¯), then the value function
C¯Vi(β¯i) can be expressed as
min
β¯i
C¯Vi(β¯i) = minˇ¯βi
E
[
( ˇ¯βi)
>
(
(Ri + R¯i) + γ(Bi + B¯i)
>P¯i(Bi + B¯i)
)
ˇ¯βi
]
≥ 0.
Furthermore, for every given random variable ˇ¯βi, the value minβ¯i:β¯i,0=ˇ¯βi C¯Vi(β¯i) is attained at
β¯i,t = −LiV¯i,t for t ≥ 1.
We have directly the following sufficient condition for the convexity-concavity condition.
Lemma 17. If the four discrete Algebraic Riccati equations (DARE-i) and (DARE-MF-i) for i = 1, 2,
i.e., (43) and (44), have solutions (Pi, P¯i) such that
(45) γB>i PiBi +Ri  0, γ(Bi + B¯i)>P¯i(Bi + B¯i) + (Ri + R¯i)  0,
then the convexity-concavity condition (38)–(39) for the process V1 and V2 holds.
Together with the sufficient condition of the Pontryagin maximum principle (Proposition 14), we have
Corollary 18. Let (P1, P2, P¯1, P¯2) be solutions to the four discrete Algebraic Riccati equations in
Lemma 17, and they satisfy conditions (45), then the pair of control processes (u1,u2) ∈ Uopenad defined
in Proposition 14 by (40) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game.
To conclude this section, we cite a result from [46], tailored to our setting, which provides a sufficient
condition for the existence of solutions to discrete Algebraic Riccati equation. Based on this result, we
propose a sufficient condition for the existence of (P1, P2, P¯1, P¯2) in Corollary 18. We say that (A,Bi)
is γ−stabilizable if there exists a matrix K ∈ R`×d such that all eigenvalues of γ1/2(A − BiK) in the
complex plan lie inside the unit circle, i.e. γ‖A−BiK‖2 < 1.
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Lemma 19 (Theorem 3.1 in [46]). Assume that Q ∈ Sd, Ri  0, and (A,Bi) is γ−stabilizable, for
i = 1, 2. For a matrix η ∈ Sd, let us denote by
(46) Ri(η) := (−1)i−1Q− η + γA>ηA− γ2A>ηBi
(
γB>i ηBi +Ri
)−1
B>i ηA.
Then the (DARE-i) has a symmetric solution Pi ∈ Sd satisfying
Ri(Pi) = 0, and γB>i PiBi +Ri  0
if and only if the set
(47) Di :=
{
η ∈ Sd | γB>i ηBi +Ri  0, Ri(η)  0
}
is not empty. Moreover, we have Pi  η for all η ∈ Di, and γ‖A−BiKi‖2 < 1 with Ki = (γB>i PiBi +
Ri)
−1(γB>i PiA).
Similarly, for the existence of P¯i to (DARE-MF-i) satisfying condition (45), we can define R¯i(η) as
the right hand side of (44) and consider the set
D¯i :=
{
η¯ ∈ Sd | γ(Bi + B¯i)>η¯(Bi + B¯i) + (Ri + R¯i)  0, R¯i(η¯)  0
}
.
We notice that if γ‖A‖2 < 1, the pair (A,Bi) will be γ−stabilizable, for i = 1, 2. So, under Assumption
1, we have (A,B1), (A,B2), (A˜, B˜1) and (A˜, B˜2) are all γ−stabilizable.
Corollary 20. Under Assumption 1, and we assume that Q, Q¯ ∈ Sd, Ri, Ri + R¯i  0 for i = 1, 2. If
D1,D2, D¯1, D¯2 6= ∅, and if the forward-backward system of equations (37) holds for x and p, then there
exists an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum game.
5. Closed-loop information structure
In this section, we turn our attention to closed-loop controls, that is, controls which are functions of
the state and the conditional mean. We will in fact focus on a specific class of such functions.
5.1. Admissible set of controls. We start by defining the class of functions we will consider in the
rest of this section.
Definition 21. For i = 1, 2, a closed-loop feedback strategy (or policy) for player i is a function vθi :
Rd×Rd → R`, (x, x¯) 7→ (−1)iKi(x−x¯)+(−1)iLix¯ parameterized by a tuple θi = (Ki, Li) whereKi and Li
are (deterministic) matrices in R`×d. A pair of policies given by parameters (θ1, θ2) ∈ (R`×d)2× (R`×d)2
for the two players is called a closed-loop feedback policy profile.
For simplicity, in the sequel, we will use interchangeably the terms strategy, policy and parameters.
In other words, for any θ, we identify the parameters θ with the induced closed-loop policy vθ.
We consider the set of admissible policy in the closed-loop information structure as follow:
(48) Θclosead =
{
(θ1, θ2) ∈ (R`×d)2 × (R`×d)2 | xθ1,θ2 ∈ X
}
,
where the state process xθ1,θ2 = (xθ1,θ2t )t≥0 is controlled by the pair of closed-loop feedback control
processes (u1,u2) ∈ Uloc × Uloc defined by
(49) ui,t = (−1)iKi(xθ1,θ2t − x¯θ1,θ2t ) + (−1)iLix¯θ1,θ2t .
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When we plug in the above closed-loop feedback controls (49) into the state process dynamics (4), we
obtain that, for every t ≥ 0,
xθ1,θ2t+1 = (A−B1K1 +B2K2)
(
xθ1,θ2t − x¯θ1,θ2t
)
+
(
A˜− B˜1L1 + B˜2L2
)
x¯θ1,θ2t + 
0
t+1 + 
1
t+1,
where A˜ = A+A¯, B˜1 = B1+B¯1, and B˜2 = B2+B¯2. By Proposition 2, the process xθ1,θ2 is L2−discounted
globally integrable under the assumption:
γ‖A−B1K1 +B2K2‖2 < 1, and γ‖A˜− B˜1L1 + B˜2L2‖2 < 1.
Thus, it is reasonable to consider the following subset of Θclosead :
Θ =
{
(θ1, θ2) ∈ (R`×d)2 × (R`×d)2 | γ‖A−B1K1 +B2K2‖2 < 1,(50)
γ‖A˜− B˜1L1 + B˜2L2‖2 < 1
}
.
Despite its simple definition, one can check that the set Θ is not convex (see e.g. the Appendix
of [36]). Moreover, the set Θclosead does not have a simple expression in terms of the model parameters.
Without any additional assumptions, the two players need to decide together the set of admissible policy
profiles Θclosead before playing against each other in a zero-sum game. However, in some situations, we
can consider a subset of Θclosead of the form Θ1 ×Θ2 where Θ1,Θ2 are two independent closed subsets in
Uclosead , so that a player is able to choose freely and independently her admissible strategy without being
affected by the L2-integrability issue of the state process caused by the choice of strategy of her opponent.
Under Assumption 1, namely γ‖A‖2 < 1 and γ‖A˜‖2 < 1, there exists two pairs of real numbers
(η1, η2) ∈ R2 and (η˜1, η˜2) ∈ R2 such that
κ := γ‖A‖2 + γ (η21‖B1‖2 + η22‖B2‖2) < 1, κ˜ := γ‖A˜‖2 + γ (η˜21‖B˜1‖2 + η˜22‖B˜2‖2) < 1.
For i = 1, 2, let us denote r(i)K = ηi
√
1
2
(
1
κ − 1
)
, and r(i)L = η˜i
√
1
2
(
1
κ˜ − 1
)
.
The following lemma, obtained by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, provides an example in which the two
players are able to choose their admissible strategies independently of each other.
Lemma 22. Assuming the closed-loop feedback policies θ1 = (K1, L1) ∈ R`×d×R`×d and θ2 = (K2, L2) ∈
R`×d × R`×d satisfy ‖Ki‖ ≤ r(i)K and ‖Li‖ ≤ r(i)L for i = 1, 2, then (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ.
If the context is clear, we omit in the following sections the superscript (θ1, θ2) in state processes
(xθ1,θ2t )t≥0.
5.2. Auxiliary processes. We apply a re-parametrization on the state variable xt as follow: for every
t ≥ 0, let
yt = xt − x¯t, zt = x¯t.
We denote y = (yt)t≥0 and z = (zt)t≥0 the two auxiliary state processes derived from x. For the sake of
clarity, we introduce some new notations on the control processes using the sample re-parametrization
method:
u
(y)
1,t := u1,t − u¯1,t = −K1yt, u(y)2,t := u2,t − u¯2,t = K2yt
u
(z)
1,t := u¯1,t = −L1zt, u(z)2,t := u¯2,t = L2zt,
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The processes (yt)t≥0 and (zt)t≥0 defined in this way follow the dynamics
yt+1 = Ayt +B1u
(y)
1,t +B2u
(y)
2,t + 
1
t+1, y0 ∼ 10,(51)
zt+1 = A˜zt + B˜1u
(z)
1,t + B˜2u
(z)
2,t + 
0
t+1, z0 ∼ 00,(52)
where 00, 10 are random variables with distributions µ00 and µ10 respectively. We then observe that for
every t, t′ ≥ 0, the random variables yt and zt are respectively F1−measurable and F0−measurable, and
they are independent.
The running cost at time t defined by equation (2) can also expressed using the above notations:
c(xt, x¯t, u1,t, u¯1,t, u2,t, u¯2,t)
=y>t Qyt + (u
(y)
1,t )
>R1u
(y)
1,t − (u(y)2,t )>R2u(y)2,t + z>t Q˜zt + (u(z)1,t )>R˜1u(z)1,t − (u(z)2,t )>R˜2u(z)2,t
=cy(yt, u
(y)
1,t , u
(y)
2,t ) + cz(zt, u
(z)
1,t , u
(z)
2,t ),
where Q˜ = Q+ Q¯, R˜1 = R1 + R¯1, R˜2 = R2 + R¯2, and cy : Rd×R`×R` → R and cz : Rd×R`×R` → R
are the running cost functions associated to (yt)t≥0 and (zt)t≥0 defined by
cy(yt, u
(y)
1,t , u
(y)
2,t ) := y
>
t Qyt + (u
(y)
1,t )
>R1u
(y)
1,t − (u(y)2,t )>R2u(y)2,t
and
cz(zt, u
(z)
1,t , u
(z)
2,t ) := z
>
t Q˜zt + (u
(z)
1,t )
>R˜1u
(z)
1,t − (u(z)2,t )>R˜2u(z)2,t .
We denote by C(θ1, θ2) = J(u1,u2) the utility function associated to a closed-loop feedback policy
profile (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ. As what has been presented in the proof of Proposition 46, we introduce two
auxiliary utility functions Cy(K1,K2, y˜) and Cz(L1, L2, z˜) defined as
(53a)
(53b)

Cy(K1,K2, y˜) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtcy(yt, u
(y)
1,t , u
(y)
2,t )
∣∣∣y0 = y˜] ,
Cz(L1, L2, z˜) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtcz(zt, u
(z)
1,t , u
(z)
2,t )
∣∣∣z0 = z˜] ,
in which the control processes are (u(y)1,t , u
(z)
1,t ) = (−K1yt,−L1zt) and (u(y)2,t , u(z)2,t ) = (K2yt, L2zt). Lemma 4
shows that xθ1,θ2t is L2−integrable if and only if y and z are L2−integrable. With the new notations,
we let
(54) C(θ1, θ2) = Ey˜[Cy(K1,K2, y˜)] + Ez˜[Cz(L1, L2, z˜)].
Now we can define the closed-loop saddle point, also known as the Nash equilibrium in the closed-loop
information structure, for the zero-sum game.
Definition 23. A closed-loop feedback policy profile (θ∗1, θ∗2) ∈ Θclosead with θ∗1 = (K∗1 , L∗1) and θ∗2 =
(K∗2 , L∗2) is said to be a closed-loop saddle point for the zero-sum game (CLSP for short) if and only if
• for every θ1 = (K1, L1) ∈ R`×d × R`×d such that (θ1, θ∗2) ∈ Θclosead , we have
C(θ1, θ
∗
2) ≥ C(θ∗1, θ∗2),
• and for every θ2 = (K2, L2) ∈ R`×d × R`×d such that (θ∗1, θ2) ∈ Θclosead , we have
C(θ∗1, θ2) ≤ C(θ∗1, θ∗2).
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Remark 24. We notice that the state processes associated with C(θ1, θ∗2), C(θ∗1, θ∗2), and C(θ∗1, θ2) are
all different. For example, the state process xθ1,θ∗2 appearing in C(θ1, θ∗2) follows the dynamics
x
θ1,θ∗2
t+1 = Ax
θ1,θ∗2
t +B1u1,t + B¯1u¯1,t +B2u
∗
2,t + B¯2u¯
∗
2,t + 
1
t+1 + 
0
t+1
= (A−B1K1 +B2K∗2 ) yθ1,θ
∗
2
t +
(
A˜− B˜1L1 + B˜2L∗2
)
z
θ1,θ∗2
t + 
0
t+1 + 
1
t+1
with xθ1,θ
∗
2
0 ∼ 00 + 10, whereas the state process xθ
∗
1 ,θ
∗
2 is given by
x
θ∗1 ,θ
∗
2
t+1 = (A−B1K∗1 +B2K∗2 ) yθ
∗
1 ,θ
∗
2
t +
(
A˜− B˜1L∗1 + B˜2L∗2
)
z
θ∗1 ,θ
∗
2
t + 
0
t+1 + 
1
t+1.
Remark 25. We can see that the process (yt)t≥0 is completely controlled by (K1,K2) or by (u
(y)
1 ,u
(y)
2 ),
and likewise for the process (zt)t≥0 by (L1, L2) or by (u
(z)
1 ,u
(z)
2 ). Moreover, the noise processes associated
with (yt)t≥0 and (zt)t≥0 are independent. So when the two players are at CLSP (θ∗1, θ∗2), and one of them,
say controller 1, perturbs her policy with a parameter set θ1 = (K1, L1) different from θ∗1 = (K∗1 , L∗1), we
can look at the difference between the costs Ey˜[Cy(K1,K∗2 , y˜)] and Ey˜[Cy(K∗1 ,K∗2 , y˜)], and separately at
the difference between Ez˜[Cz(L1, L∗2, z˜)] and Ez˜[Cz(L∗1, L∗2, z˜)].
We introduce here two sets related to the admissible policies with respect to the processes (yt)t≥0 and
(zt)t≥0. Let us denote by
(55a)
(55b)
{
Θy =
{
(K1,K2) ∈ R`×d × R`×d | y ∈ X
}
,
Θz =
{
(L1, L2) ∈ R`×d × R`×d | z ∈ X
}
,
where y and z are two processes following the dynamics (51) and (52). The processes y and z can be
constructed without any prior knowledge from x, and they are completely determined by the choice of
matrix pairs (K1,K2) and (L1, L2). From Lemma 4, the set Θy (and similarly Θz) can be understood
as the collection of pair of matrices consisting of the first (or second) elements in policies θ1 and θ2.
Definition 26. A pair of matrices (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) ∈ R`×d × R`×d is said to be a closed-loop feedback saddle
point in Θy (CLSP − y for short) if for every y˜ ∈ Rd, for every K1,K2 ∈ R`×d such that (K1,K∗2 ) ∈ Θy
and (K∗1 ,K2) ∈ Θy, we have
(56) Cy(K∗1 ,K2, y˜) ≤ Cy(K∗1 ,K∗2 , y˜) ≤ Cy(K1,K∗2 , y˜).
A pair of matrices (L∗1, L∗2) ∈ R`×d × R`×d is said to be a closed-loop feedback saddle point in Θz
(CLSP − z for short) if for every z˜ ∈ Rd, for every L1, L2 ∈ R`×d such that (L1, L∗2) ∈ Θz and
(L∗1, L2) ∈ Θz, we have
(57) Cz(L∗1, L2, z˜) ≤ Cz(L∗1, L∗2, z˜) ≤ Cz(L1, L∗2, z˜).
5.3. Notations and useful lemmas. In the sequel, we will use the following notations:
(58a)
(58b)
(58c)

M(P ) = γA>PA− P +Q
L1(P ) = γA>PB1, L2(P ) = γA>PB2, L12 = γB>1 PB2
N1(P ) = γB>1 PB1 +R1, N2(P ) = γB>2 PB2 −R2.
The following lemma is about the inverse of block matrix.
Lemma 27 (Inverse 2× 2 block matrix; Corollary 4.1 in [44]). It holds:
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• If N1(P ) and S2 := N2(P )− L12(P )>N1(P )−1L12(P ) are invertible, then
N (P )−1 =
 N1(P )−1 +N1(P )−1L12(P )S−12 L12(P )>N1(P )−1 −N1(P )−1L12(P )S−12
−(N1(P )−1L12(P )S−12 )> S−12
 .
• If N2(P ) and S1 := N1(P )− L12(P )N2(P )−1L12(P )> are invertible, then
N (P )−1 =
 S−11 −S−11 L12(P )N2(P )
−(S−11 L12(P )N2(P ))−1 N2(P ) +N2(P )−1L12(P )>S−12 L12(P )N2(P )−1
 .
Lemma 28 (Schur’s lemma). For every symmetric matrices M ∈ Sd and N ∈ S`, and for every matrix
L ∈ Rd×`, if N is invertible, then[
x
u
]> [
M L
L> N
] [
x
u
]
= x>
(
M − LN−1L>
)
x+
(
u+N−1L>x
)>
N
(
u+N−1L>x
)
.
5.4. Algebraic Riccati equations. We present here a few lemmas and some notations that will be
useful to understand the closed-loop saddle point in Θy (CLSP − y). Since the processes y and z follow
similar linear dynamics but with different coefficients, we omit the proof for lemmas corresponding to
CLSP − z. We use the notation 〈u, v〉 to represent the product u>v for two vectors in Rd. Using the
dynamics (51) for (yt)t≥0, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 29. For every symmetric matrix P ∈ Sd, we have
γt+1E [〈Pyt+1, yt+1〉]
=γtE [〈Pyt, yt〉] + γt+1E
[
(1t+1)
>P1t+1
]
+ γtE

 ytu(y)1,t
u
(y)
2,t

>  M(P )−Q L1(P ) L2(P )L1(P )> N1(P )−R1 L12(P )
L2(P )> L12(P )> N2(P ) +R2

 ytu(y)1,t
u
(y)
2,t


where we recall the notation (58).
Let us denote
C∗y (P ; y˜) := y˜
>P y˜ +
γ
1− γE
[
(11)
>P11
]
.
Corollary 30. For every P ∈ Sd and every (K1,K2) ∈ Θy, we have
Cy(K1,K2, y˜)− C∗y (P ; y˜)(59)
= E
 ∞∑
t=0
γt
 ytu(y)1,t
u
(y)
2,t

>  M(P ) L1(P ) L2(P )L1(P )> N1(P ) L12(P )
L1(P )> L12(P )> N2(P )

 ytu(y)1,t
u
(y)
2,t

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ y0 = y˜
 .
Remark 31. We notice that the difference between Cy(K1,K2, y˜) and C∗y (P ; y˜) depends on the cross
product 〈L12(P )>u(y)1,t , u(y)2,t 〉. When we perturb only one policy parameter, say K1 for example, the
change involved in the cost Cy(K1,K2, y˜) is not only caused by the state process (yt)t≥0 but also by
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the interactions between the two feedback control processes, even if no term in definition (53a) of
Cy(K1,K2, y˜) is directly related to this cross interaction between strategies. The cross product L12(P )
in equation (59) makes our main result of this section, namely Proposition 36 for the CLSP, harder to
prove, compared with a continuous-time result as discussed e.g. in [48].
Proof. The process y = (yt)t≥0 following dynamics (51) with matrices (K1,K2) ∈ Θy satisfies
yt+1 = (A−B1K1 +B2K2)yt + 1t+1, y0 = y˜.
By definition of Θy, see (55a), y is L2−discounted globally integrable. By Lemma 3, we have
limt→0 E[γt‖yt‖2] = 0. Thus, by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
lim
t→∞
∣∣E [γt〈Pyt, yt〉|y0 = y˜]∣∣ ≤ lim
t→∞ ‖P‖E
[
γt‖yt‖2|y0 = y˜
]
= 0.
By applying recursively Lemma 29 from t = T down to 0, and then letting T tends to infinity, we obtain
equation (59).

We introduce here another Discrete Algebraic Riccati equation in the set of symmetric matrices Sd
for the discrete-time process (yt)t and the cost Cy:
P = γA>PA+Q
− γ2[A>PB1, A>PB2]
[
γB>1 PB1 +R1 γB>1 PB2
γB>2 PB1 γB>2 PB2 −R2
]−1 [
B>1 PA
B>2 PA
]
.
The above equation can also be written in a compact form:
(60) 0 =M(P )− L(P )N (P )−1L(P )>
with (using the notations introduced in (58))
(61) L(P ) = [L1(P ),L2(P )] ∈ Rd×(`+`)
and a 2× 2 block matrix
(62) N (P ) =
[ N1(P ) L12(P )
L12(P )> N2(P )
]
∈ R(`+`)×(`+`).
To distinguish with other Algebraic Riccati equations introduced earlier sections, we may refer (60) as
(ARE-y).
In the spirit of Nash equilibrium, we discuss in the following a few results related to the situations
when only one controller intends to change her strategy but her opponent keeps the original one.
Let us denote by y2∗ = (y2∗t )t≥0 the state process associated to a pair of strategy (K1,K∗2 ) ∈ Θy
where K∗2 is a predetermined matrix in R`×d. Then the process y2∗ follows the dynamics
(63) y2∗t+1 = (A+B2K
∗
2 )y
2∗
t +B1u
(y)
1,t + 
1
t+1 = (A+B2K
∗
2 −B1K1)y2∗t + 1t+1, y2∗0 = y˜,
where (u(y)1,t )t≥0 is the control process adopted by player 1 (with parameter K1).
Corollary 32. There holds
Cy(K1,K
∗
2 , y˜)− C∗y (P ; y˜)
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= E
 ∞∑
t=0
γt
[
y2∗t
u
(y)
1,t
]> [ M2∗(P ) L2∗1 (P )
L2∗1 (P )> N 2∗1 (P )
][
y2∗t
u
(y)
1,t
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣ y0 = y˜

where 
M2∗(P ) = γ(A+B2K∗2 )>P (A+B2K∗2 )− P +Q−K∗2R2K∗2
=M(P ) + L2(P )K∗2 + (L2(P )K∗2 )> + (K∗2 )>N2(P )K∗2
L2∗1 (P ) = γ(A+B2K∗2 )>PB1 = L1(P ) + (L12(P )K∗2 )>
N 2∗1 (P ) = γB>1 PB1 +R1 = N1(P ).
The ARE associated to the process y2∗ and the value function Cy(·,K∗2 , y˜) is given by
(64) 0 =M2∗(P )− L2∗1 (P )(N 2∗1 (P ))−1(L2∗1 (P ))>.
With a proper choice of K∗2 , we can connect equation (64) to the (ARE-y).
Lemma 33. For any symmetric matrix P ∈ Sd such that N1(P ) and S2 = N2(P ) −
L12(P )>N1(P )−1L12(P ) are invertible, let us consider that player 2 fixes her strategy with parameter
(65) K∗2 =
(
L12(P )>N2(P )−1L12(P )−N2(P )
)−1(L2(P )> − L12(P )>N1(P )−1L1(P )>).
Then P is a solution to (64) if and only if it is a solution to the (ARE-y) (60).
Proof. To alleviate the notations, we omit the matrix P in this proof. The idea is based on algebraic
matrix manipulations with the help of Lemma 27 to invert a 2× 2 block matrix N (P ). First, we notice
that
K∗2 = −S−12
(
L>2 − L>12N−11 L>1
)
.
Then, the right hand side of ARE (64) becomes:
M2∗ − L2∗1 (N 2∗1 )−1(L2∗1 )>
=M+ L2K∗2 + (K∗2 )>L>2 + (K∗2 )>N2K∗2
−
(
L1N−11 L>1 + (K∗2 )>L>12N−11 L>1 + L1N−11 L12K∗2 + (K∗2 )>L>12N−11 L12K∗2
)
=M−L1N−11 L>1 +
(
L2 − L1N−11 L12
)
K∗2
+ (K∗2 )
>
(
L>2 − L>12N−11 L>1
)
+ (K∗2 )
>
(
N2 − L>12N−11 L12
)
K∗2 .
Since K∗2 = −S−12
(
L>2 − L>12N−11 L>1
)
and S2 = N2 − L>12N−11 L12, we have
M2∗ − L2∗1 (N 2∗1 )−1(L2∗1 )> =M−L1N−11 L>1 −
(
L2 − L1N−11 L12
)
S−12
(
L2 − L1N−11 L12
)>
.
Now, under the assumption that N1 and S2 are invertible, we apply Lemma 27 to N and obtain
M−LN−1L> =M− [L1,L2]
[ N−11 +N−11 L12S−12 L>12N−11 −N−11 L12S−12
−S−12 L>12N−11 S−12
] [ L>1
L>2
]
=M−
(
L1N−11 L1 + (L1N−11 L12)S−12 (L>12N−11 L>1 )
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− (L1N−11 L12)S−12 L>2 − L2S−12 (L>12N−11 L>1 ) + L2S−12 L>2
)
=M−L1N−11 L>1 −
(
L2 − L1N−11 L12
)
S−12
(
L2 − L1N−11 L12
)>
.
Hence,M2∗ − L2∗1 (N 2∗1 )−1(L2∗1 )> =M−LN−1L>. 
We state here briefly the counterparts of Corollary 32 and Lemma 33 for the situation when player 1
fixed her strategy to some predetermined matrix K∗1 ∈ R`×d.
Corollary 34.
Cy(K
∗
1 ,K2, y˜)− C∗y (P ; y˜)
= E
 ∞∑
t=0
γt
[
y1∗t
u
(y)
2,t
]> [ M1∗(P ) L1∗2 (P )
L1∗2 (P )> N 1∗2 (P )
][
y1∗t
u
(y)
2,t
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣ y0 = y˜
 ,
where 
M1∗(P ) = γ(A−B1K∗1 )>P (A−B1K∗1 )− P +Q+K∗1R1K∗1
=M(P )− L1(P )K∗1 − (L1(P )K∗1 )> + (K∗1 )>N1(P )K∗1
L1∗2 (P ) = γ(A−B1K∗1 )>PB2 = L2(P )− (L12(P )>K∗1 )>
N 1∗2 (P ) = γB>2 PB2 −R2 = N2(P ),
and the state process (y1∗t )t≥0 follows the dynamics
(66) y1∗t+1 = (A−B1K∗1 )y1∗t +B2u(y)2,t + 1t+1, y1∗0 = y˜.
Lemma 35. If player 1 chooses her strategy with parameter
K∗1 = −
(
L12(P )N2(P )−1L12(P )> −N1(P )
)−1(L1(P )> − L12(P )N2(P )−1L2(P )>),(67)
where P ∈ Sd and the matrices N2(P ) and S1 = N1(P ) − L12(P )N2(P )−1L12(P )> are invertible, then
we have
(68) M1∗(P )− L1∗2 (P )(N 1∗2 (P ))−1(L1∗2 (P ))> =M(P )− L(P )N (P )−1L(P )>.
5.5. Sufficient condition. We now phrase a sufficient condition of optimality. The necessary part will
be discussed in Section 7, since it will serve as a basis for our numerical algorithms. For a symmetric
matrix P ∈ Sd, let us denote
K∗i = −
(
L12(P )Nj(P )−1L12(P )> −Ni(P )
)−1(Li(P )> − L12(P )Nj(P )−1Lj(P )>)(69)
for i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, under the condition that the inverse of matrices involved above exist.
Proposition 36. Assume that we have the following two conditions:
(1) The (ARE-y) (60)M(P )−L(P )N (P )−1L(P )> = 0 admits a symmetric solution P ∈ Sd satis-
fying
(70) γB>1 PB1 +R1  0, γB>2 PB2 −R2 ≺ 0.
(2) The pair of matrices (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) ∈ Θy.
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Then (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) is a CLSP − y in Θy. Moreover, we have
Cy(K
∗
1 ,K
∗
2 , y˜) = C
∗
y (P ; y) = y˜
>P y˜ +
γ
1− γE
[
(11)
>P11
]
.
The control processes (u(y),∗1,t )t≥0 and (u
(y),∗
1,t )t≥0 corresponding to the CLSP − y (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) are given by,
for every t ≥ 0,
(71) u(y),∗1,t = −K∗1y∗t , u(y),∗2,t = K∗2y∗t
where the process (y∗t )t≥0 follows the dynamics
y∗t+1 = (A−B1K∗1 +B2K∗2 )y∗t + 1t+1, y∗0 = y˜.
These two control processes satisfy the optimality condition: for every t ≥ 0,
(72) N (P )u(y),∗t + L(P )>y∗t = 0
where u(y),∗t = [(u
(y),∗
1,t )
>, (u(y),∗2,t )
>]> ∈ R2`, or equivalently
(73a)
(73b)
N1(P )u
(y),∗
1,t + L12(P )u(y),∗2,t = −L1(P )>y∗t ,
L>12(P )u(y),∗1,t +N2(P )u(y),∗2,t = −L2(P )>y∗t .
Proof. From condition (70), we have
N1(P ) = γB>1 PB1 +R1  0, and L12(P )>N1(P )−1L12(P )−N2(P )  0,
so that the matrix K∗2 is well defined in R`×d. Similarly, we have N2(P ) ≺ 0 and
L12(P )N2(P )−1L12(P )> − N1(P ) ≺ 0, so that K∗1 is well-defined too. Moreover, Lemma 27 implies
that the 2× 2 block matrix
N (P ) =
[ N1(P ) L12(P )
L12(P )> N2(P )
]
is invertible. By applying Schur’s lemma (Lemma 28) to the block matrix shown in Corollary 30, we
get, for every time t ≥ 0: ytu(y)1,t
u
(y)
2,t

>  M(P ) L1(P ) L2(P )L1(P )> N1(P ) L12(P )
L1(P )> L12(P )> N2(P )

 ytu(y)1,t
u
(y)
2,t

=y>t
(
M(P )− L(P )N (P )−1L(P )>
)
yt
+
(
u
(y)
t +N (P )−1L(P )>yt
)>N (P )(u(y)t +N (P )−1L(P )>yt)
=(i)t + (ii)t,
where u(y)t = [(u
(y)
1,t )
>, (u(y)2,t )
>]> ∈ R2`. Since P satisfies (ARE-y) (60), so that the first term (i)t = 0 for
every t ≥ 0. Thus, by Corollary 30, for every (K1,K2) ∈ Θy and y˜ ∈ Rd,
Cy(K1,K2, y˜)− C∗(P ; y˜)
= E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
u
(y)
t +N (P )−1L(P )>yt
)>N (P )(u(y)t +N (P )−1L(P )>yt)
∣∣∣∣∣ y0 = y˜
]
.
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If we choose (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) ∈ R`×d × R`×d satisfying equation (72), i.e. N (P )u(y),∗t + L(P )>y∗t = 0, then we
obtain (ii)t = 0 for every t ≥ 0. In this case, we have
Cy(K
∗
1 ,K
∗
2 , y˜) = C
∗
y (P ; y˜) = y˜
>P y˜ +
γ
1− γE
[
(11)
>P11
]
<∞.
Let us move on to obtain expressions for (K∗1 ,K∗2 ). Since the matrix N (P ) is invertible, there
exists a unique solution u(y),∗t to (72) for every t ≥ 0. We plug-in the definition of L(P ), N (P ), and
u
(y),∗
t = [(u
(y),∗
1,t )
>, (u(y),∗2,t )
>]>, equation (72) is equivalent to the system of equations (73a) and (73b).
So, by multiplying L12(P )N2(P )−1 on both sides of (73b), and subtract it to (73a), we obtain(
L12(P )N2(P )−1L12(P )> −N1(P )
)
u
(y),∗
1,t =
(
L1(P )> − L12(P )N2(P )−1L2(P )>
)
y∗t .
By the assumption on N1(P )  0 and N2(P ) ≺ 0, we have L12(P )N2(P )−1L12(P )>−N1(P ) ≺ 0 which
is invertible. As a consequence, we obtain the optimal feedback control for player 1 by
u
(y),∗
1,t = −K∗1y∗t
where K∗1 is given by (69). Similarly, we can derive that u
(y),∗
2,t = K
∗
2y
∗
t with K∗2 given by (69). Moreover,
when we replace u(y),∗1,t=0 and u
(y),∗
2,t=0 with their expressions in (71) back into (72), and by noticing that it
holds true for every y˜ ∈ Rd, we have
(74)
{ −N1(P )K∗1 + L12(P )K∗2 = −L1(P )>
−L12(P )>K∗1 +N2(P )K∗2 = −L2(P )>.
In the following, we will show that the pair (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) is a CLSP − y, which means that it satisfies
condition (56). First, under the assumption in the statement, we know that (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) ∈ Θy. Then, we
look at the case when player 2 fixes her strategy to K∗2 , but player 1 adopts an alternative strategy K1
satisfying (K1,K∗2 ) ∈ Θy. The corresponding control at time t is given then by u(y)1,t = −K1y2∗t , where
the state process (y2∗t )t≥0 follows dynamics (63):
y2∗t+1 = (A−B1K1 +B2K∗2 )y2∗t + 1t+1 = (A+BK∗2 )y2∗t +B1u(y)1,t + 1t+1
with y2∗0 = y˜. By Corollary 32 and Schur’s lemma, we have
Cy(K1,K
∗
2 , y˜)− C∗y (P ; y˜)
=E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt(y2∗t )
>
(
M2∗(P )− L2∗1 (P )(N 2∗1 (P ))−1L2∗1 (P )>
)
y2∗t
∣∣∣∣∣ y2∗0 = y˜
]
+ E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
u
(y)
1,t + (N 2∗1 (P ))−1L2∗1 (P )>y2∗t
)>N 2∗1 (P )(
u
(y)
1,t + (N 2∗1 (P ))−1L2∗1 (P )>y2∗t
)∣∣∣ y2∗0 = y˜] .
From Lemma 33, we know that a solution P to (ARE-y) (60) is also a solution to (64):
0 =M2∗(P )− L2∗1 (P )(N 2∗1 (P ))−1(L2∗1 (P ))>.
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Moreover, we have −N1(P )K∗1 + L12(P )K∗2 = −L1(P )> which implies, by definition of N 2∗1 (P ) and
L2∗1 (P ), that
−K∗1 = −(N1(P ))−1
(
L1(P )> + L12(P )K∗2
)
= −(N 2∗1 (P ))−1L2∗1 (P )>.
Thus, together with u(y)1,t = −K1y2∗t for every t ≥ 0, we have
Cy(K1,K
∗
2 , y˜)− C∗(P ; y˜) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt(y2∗t )
>(K∗1 −K1)>N1(P )(K∗1 −K1)y2∗t
∣∣∣∣∣ y2∗0 = y˜
]
.
Consequently, the condition N1(P ) = γB>1 PB1 +R1  0 implies
Cy(K1,K
∗
2 , y˜)− Cy(K∗1 ,K∗2 , y˜) ≥ 0.
Similarly, we have K∗2 = −(N 1∗2 (P ))−1L1∗2 (P )>, so
Cy(K
∗
1 ,K2, y˜)− C∗y (P ; y˜) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt(y1∗t )
>(K∗2 −K2)>N2(P )(K∗2 −K2)y1∗t
∣∣∣∣∣ y1∗0 = y˜
]
where the process (y1∗t )t≥0 satisfies the dynamics (66) with intial y1∗0 = y˜. Thus, the condition N2(P ) =
γB>2 PB2 −R2 ≺ 0 implies
Cy(K
∗
1 ,K2, y˜)− Cy(K∗1 ,K∗2 , y˜) ≤ 0.

Remark 37. We have emphasized previously that one difficulty in Proposition 36 comes from the
presence of a cross interaction between control processes (u(y)1,t )t≥0 and (u
(y)
2,t )t≥0 shown in Corollary 30,
which disappears in the continuous-time setting. Moreover, the solution P to (ARE-y) is not involved
in N1 nor N2 in the continuous-time case. Consequently, with continuous-time closed-loop feedback
controls, a sufficient condition based only on model parameters “R1  0 and −R2 ≺ 0", which is similar
to condition (70) in Proposition 36, turns out to be a necessary condition for a CLSP−y in Θy (see [48]).
This is not the case in our discrete-time setting.
We present here similar results corresponding to the CLSP − z. Let the matrices
(N˜1, N˜2, L˜1, L˜2, L˜12, M˜ , N˜ , L˜)(P¯ ) be defined by using the same expressions in equations (58)(a), (b),
(c), but by replacing (A,B1, B2, Q) to (A˜, B˜1, B˜2, Q˜).
For a symmetric matrix P¯ ∈ Sd, let us denote
L∗i = −
(
L˜12(P¯ )N˜j(P¯ )−1L˜12(P¯ )> − N˜i(P¯ )
)−1(L˜i(P¯ )> − L˜12(P¯ )N˜j(P¯ )−1L˜j(P¯ )>)(75)
for i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, under the condition that the inverse of matrices appearing above exist.
Lemma 38. Assume the following Algebraic Riccati equation (ARE-z):
(76) 0 = M˜(P¯ )− L˜(P¯ )N˜ (P¯ )L˜(P¯ )>
admits a solution P¯ ∈ Sd which is such that
(77) γB˜>1 P¯ B˜1 + R˜1  0 and γB˜>2 P¯ B˜2 − R˜2 ≺ 0.
Assume in addition that the pair of matrices (L∗1, L∗2) given by (75) is in Θz. Then, (L∗1, L∗2) is a
CLSP − z in Θz.
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Corollary 39. If the two pair of matrices (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) ∈ Θy and (L∗1, L∗2) ∈ Θz defined in Lemmas 36 and
38 are CLSP −y and CLSP −z respectively, then the closed-loop feedback policy profile (θ∗1, θ∗2) ∈ Θclosead
defined by
θ∗1 = (K
∗
1 , L
∗
1), and θ
∗
2 = (K
∗
1 , L
∗
2)
is a closed-loop saddle point for the zero-sum game. The optimal value of the utility function is given by
C(θ∗1, θ
∗
2) = E
[
y˜>P y˜
]
+ E
[
z˜>P¯ z˜
]
+
γ
1− γE
[
(11)
>P11 + (
0
1)
>P¯ 01
]
,
where P and P¯ are solutions to the (ARE-y) (60) and (ARE-z) (76) satisfying conditions (70) and (77)
respectively.
6. Connection between closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria
In this section, we show that the open-loop and closed-loop equilibria are tightly related. To this end,
we impose the following assumption on the model parameters.
Assumption 2. We assume that ` = d, and the matrices B1, B2, R1, R2 and B˜1, B˜2, R˜1, R˜2 are all
invertible.
For an invertible matrix S ∈ Rd×d, we denote S−> = (S>)−1 = (S−1)>. The following lemma relates
the inverse of a 2-by-2 block matrix to its off-diagonal term [44].
Lemma 40 (Corollary 4.1 in [44]). If the matrices L12(P ) = γB>1 PB2 ∈ R2` and S3 = L12(P )> −
N2(P )L12(P )−1N1(P ) are invertible, then matrix N (P ) has an inverse expressed by
(78) N (P )−1 =
[ N1 L12
L>12 N2
]−1
(P ) =
[ −S−13 N2L−112 S−13
L−112 + L−112 N1S−13 N2L−112 −L−112 N1S−13
]
(P ) .
If a solution P c ∈ Sd to (ARE-y) is invertible, we have an alternative expression for (ARE-y).
Lemma 41. We suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Let P c ∈ Sd be a solution to the Algebraic Riccati
equation (60)
0 =M(P c)− L(P c)N (P c)−1L(P c)>.
If P c and (P c)−1 + γB1R−11 B
>
1 − γB2R−12 B>2 are invertible, then
M(P c)− L(P c)N (P c)−1L(P c)> =
= Q− P c +A>
(
1
γ
(P c)−1 +B1R−11 B
>
1 −B2R−12 B>2
)−1
A.(79)
Proof. First, under Assumption 2, we observe that
S3 = L12(P c)> −N2(P c)L12(P c)−1N1(P c)
= γB>2 P
cB1 − (γB>2 P cB2 −R2)
(
1
γ
B−12 (P
c)−1B−>1
)
(γB>1 P
cB1 +R1)
= γB>2 P
cB1 −
(
B>2 B
−>
1 R1 + γB
>
2 P
cB1 − 1
γ
R2B
−1
2 (P
c)−1B−>1 R1 −R2B−12 B1
)
= −B>2 B−>1 R1 +
1
γ
R2B
−1
2 (P
c)−1B−>1 R1 +R2B
−1
2 B1
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= R>2 B
−1
2
(
−B2R−12 B>2 +
1
γ
(P c)−1 +B1R−11 B
>
1
)
B−>1 R1(80)
and also
(81)

N2(P c)L12(P c)−1 = B>2 B−>1 −
1
γ
R2B
−1
2 (P
c)−1B−>1
L12(P c)−1N1(P c) = 1
γ
B−12 (P
c)−1B−T1 R1 +B
−1
2 B1.
Since L12(P c) and S3 are invertible, by Lemma 40 we obtain
1
γ2
L(P c)N (P c)−1L(P c)>
=
[
A>P cB1, A>P cB2
]
N (P c)−1
[
B>1 P cA
B>2 P cA
]
= −A>P cB1S−13 N2L−112 B>1 P cA+A>P cB1S−13 B>2 P cA
+A>P cB2
(L−112 + L−112 N1S−13 N2L−112 )B>1 P cA−A>P cB2L−112 N1S−13 B>2 P cA
= (i) + (ii) + (iii) + (iv).(82)
We then use equation (81) to simplify (i) and (iv):
(i) = −A>P cB1S−13
(
N2L−112 B>1 P cA
)
= −A>P cB1S−13
(
B>2 P
cA− 1
γ
R2B
−1
2 A
)
= −(ii) + 1
γ
A>P cB1S−13 R2B
−1
2 A,
and
(iv) =
(
−A>P cB2L12N1
)
S−13 B
>
2 P
cA =
(
−1
γ
A>B−>1 R1 +A
>(P c)>B1
)
S−13 B
>
2 P
cA
= −(ii)− 1
γ
A>B−T1 R1S
−1
3 B
>
2 P
cA.
Moreover we have
(iii) = A>P cB2L−112 B>1 P cA+
(
A>P cB2L−112 N1
)
S−13
(
N2L−112 B>1 P cA
)
=
1
γ
A>P cA+
(
1
γ
A>B−>1 R1 +A
>(P c)>B1
)
S−13
(
B>2 P
cA− 1
γ
R2B
−1
2 A
)
=
1
γ
A>P cA+ (ii)− 1
γ2
A>B−>1 R1S
−1
3 R2B
−1
2 A+
1
γ
A>B−T1 R1S
−1
3 B
>
2 P
cA
− 1
γ
A>P cB1S−13 R2B
−1
2 A.
Then, equation (82) becomes
L(P c)N (P c)−1L(P c)> = γA>P cA−A>B−>1 R1S−13 R2B−12 A.
Together with equation (80), we conclude that
0 =M(P c)− L(P c)N (P c)−1L(P c)>
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= Q− P c +A>
(
1
γ
(P c)−1 +B1R−11 B
>
1 −B2R−12 B>2
)−1
A.

Lemma 42. Assume that Assumption 2 holds. Let P o ∈ Rd×d be a solution to the Algebraic Riccati
equation (26) derived from the open-loop information structure, namely:
(83) P o = γ
(
A>P o + 2Q
)
(A+ (B1Γ1 +B2Γ2)P
o)
where Γ1 = −12R−11 B>1 and Γ2 = 12R−12 B>2 . We consider a matrix given by
(84) P c =
1
2
A>P o +Q.
If A>P o = (P o)>A, and the symmetric matrices P c and (P c)−1 + γ
(
B1R
−1
1 B
>
1 −B2R−12 B>2
)
are in-
vertible, then the matrix P c ∈ Sd is a solution to (ARE-y) (60) derived from the closed-loop information
structure:
0 =M(P c)− L(P c)N (P c)−1L(P c)>.
Proof. By plugging the expression of γ1 and γ2 into equation (83), we obtain
P o + γ(A>P o + 2Q)
(
1
2
B1R
−1
1 B
>
1 −
1
2
B2R
−1
2 B
>
2
)
P o = γ(A>P o + 2Q)A.
Let P c = 12A
>P o +Q, the above equation is equivalent to(
1
γ
Id + P
c
(
B1R
−1
1 B
>
1 −B2R−12 B>2
))
P o = 2P cA,
Since we have assumed that P c and (P c)−1 + γ
(
B1R
−1
1 B
>
1 −B2R−12 B>2
)
are invertible, we must have
1
2
P o =
(
1
γ
(P c)−1 +B1R−11 B
>
1 −B>2 R−12 B>2
)−1
A.
If we multiply on both sides by A> and then add Q, by rearranging the terms, we obtain
0 = Q− P c +A>
(
1
γ
(P c)−1 +B1R−11 B
>
1 −B2R−12 B>2
)−1
A.

Remark 43. In addition to Assumption 2, if A is invertible, then from a positive definite solution P c
to (ARE-y) (60), we can define a matrix P o = 2A−>(P c − Q) ∈ Rd×d. By inverting the steps used in
Lemma 42, we can show that P o is a solution to the equation (26).
The following corollary shows that both the pair of control processes associated to a closed-loop saddle
point and the pair of processes for an open-loop Nash equilibrium will lead to the same state process,
hence the same value function for the zero-sum game.
Corollary 44. We assume that Assumption 2 holds and A, A˜ are invertible. Suppose that there exists
unique invertible solutions P o (resp. P¯ o) and P c (resp. P¯ c) to the corresponding Algebraic Riccati
equations in the open-loop information structure (26) (resp.(27)) and in the closed-loop information
structure (60) (resp. (76)). Then, we have :
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(i) The following holds, where ((K∗1 , L∗1), (K∗2 , L∗2)) are given in (69) and (75):
(85)
{−B1K∗1 +B2K∗2 = B1Γ1P o +B2Γ2P o
−B˜1L∗1 + B˜2L∗2 = B˜1Λ1P¯ o + B˜2Λ2P¯ o.
(ii) For every time t ≥ 0, the state variable xθ∗1 ,θ∗2t corresponding to a pair of closed-loop feedback con-
trol (uc,∗1 ,u
c,∗
2 ) with policies (θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2) = ((K
∗
1 , L
∗
1), (K
∗
2 , L
∗
2)) (49) has the same distribution as the
state variable xu
o,∗
1 ,u
o,∗
2
t controlled by an open-loop Nash equilibrium (u
o,∗
1 ,u
o,∗
2 ) with parameters
(P o, P¯ o) (28).
Proof. According to Lemma 42, the unique solutions P o (resp. P¯ o) and P c (resp. P¯ c) to the corre-
sponding Algebraic Riccai equation satisfy:
P c =
1
2
A>P o +Q, and P¯ c =
1
2
(A+ A¯)>P¯ o + (Q+ Q¯).
(i) It is enough to show the connection between (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) to the pair of matrices (−Γ1P o,−Γ2P o),
and the situation for (L∗1, L∗2) can be proved with similar arguments. Let us denote by Bˇ = [B1, B2] ∈
Rd×2` and Rˇ =
[
R1 0
0 −R2
]
. Then, by equation (74) and Lemma 41, since A is invertible, we have:
−B1K∗1 +B2K∗2 = −Bˇ(γBˇ>P cBˇ + Rˇ)−1
(
γBˇ>P cA
)
=
(
Id + γBˇRˇ
−1Bˇ>P c
)−1
A−A
= −
(
BˇRˇ−1Bˇ>
)(
A−>(P c −Q)
)
.
Together with P o = 2A−>(P c −Q) and the definition of Γ1,Γ2, we obtain
−B1K∗1 +B2K∗2 = −
1
2
BˇRˇ−1Bˇ>P o = B1Γ1P o +B2Γ2P o.
(ii) By comparing the state dynamics of
(
x
uo,∗1 ,u
o,∗
2
t − x¯u
o,∗
1 ,u
o,∗
2
t
)
t≥0
in the open-loop case and that of
(y
θ∗1 ,θ
∗
2
t )t≥0 (51) in the closed-loop case, we have
y
θ∗1 ,θ
∗
2
t
d
= x
uo,∗1 ,u
o,∗
2
t − x¯u
o,∗
1 ,u
o,∗
2
t
in the sense of distribution. Similar arguments shows zθ
∗
1 ,θ
∗
2
t
d
= x¯
θ∗1 ,θ
∗
2
t . Thus, the conclusion holds.

Remark 45. In the case with only one decision-maker, similar to equation (85), we can prove that
−B1K∗1 = B1Γ1P o and −B˜1L∗1 = B˜1Λ1P¯ o. Then the control process in a single population model for
the open-loop and for the closed-loop information structures are identical at every time t ≥ 0, namely
uc,∗1,t = −B1K∗1 (xθ
∗
1
t − x¯θ
∗
1
t )− B˜1L∗1x¯θ
∗
1
t = B1Γ1P
o(x
u∗1
t − x¯u
∗
1
t ) + B˜1Λ1P¯
ox¯u
∗
1 = uo,∗1,t .
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7. Algorithms
In this section, we propose policy-gradient based algorithms to find the Nash equilibrium of the zero-
sum mean-field type game. We start with a convenient expression for the gradient of the utility function,
which leads to a necessary condition of optimality (counterpart to the sufficient condition studied in
§ 5.5). Then, after introducing model-based methods, we explain how to extend them to sample-based
algorithms in which the gradient is estimated using a simulator providing stochastic realizations of the
utility. The results of this section have initially been presented in [25].
7.1. Gradient expression. We henceforth replace problem (7) by the following problem based on
closed-loop controls, introduced in Section 5. Each player i = 1, 2 chooses parameter θ∗i = (K
∗
i , L
∗
i ) such
that
J(u
θ∗1
1 ,u
θ∗2
2 ) = inf
θ1
sup
θ2
J(uθ11 ,u
θ2
2 ),
where for θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ (recall the parameter set Θ defined in (50)),
uθ1,θ2i,t = (−1)iKi(x
u
θ1
1 ,u
θ2
2
t − x¯u
θ1
1 ,u
θ2
2
t ) + (−1)iLix¯u
θ1
1 ,u
θ2
2
t , i = 1, 2.
For simplicity, we introduce the following notation xu
θ1
1 ,u
θ2
2 = xθ1,θ2 , and since we focus on linear
controls, using the notation C introduced in (54), we have
C(θ1, θ2) = J(u
θ1
1 ,u
θ2
2 ).
Moreover, we introduce yK1,K2t = x
θ1,θ2
t − x¯θ1,θ2t and zL1,L2t = x¯θ1,θ2t , which is justified by the fact that
the dynamics of y and z depend respectively only on (K1,K2) and (L1, L2).
Let P yK1,K2 be a solution to the linear equation
P yK1,K2 = Q+K
>
1 R1K1 −K>2 R2K2(86)
+ γ(A−B1K1 +B2K2)>P yK1,K2(A−B1K1 +B2K2),
and let P zL1,L2 be a solution to the linear equation
P zL1,L2 = Q˜+ L
>
1 R˜1L1 − L>2 R˜2L2(87)
+ γ(A˜− B˜1L1 + B˜2L2)>P zL1,L2(A˜− B˜1L1 + B˜2L2).
We now provide an explicit expression for the gradient of the utility function with respect to the
control parameters in terms of the solution to the equations (86) and (87). Let us denote[
Ey,1K1,K2
Ey,2K1,K2
]
= −γ
[
B>1 P
y
K1,K2
A
−B>2 P yK1,K2A
]
+ R
[
K1
K2
]
,
[
Ez,1L1,L2
Ez,2L1,L2
]
= −γ
[
B˜>1 P zL1,L2A˜
−B˜>2 P zL1,L2A˜
]
+ R˜
[
L1
L2
]
with
R =
[
R1 + γB
>
1 P
y
K1,K2
B1 −γB>1 P yK1,K2B2
−γB>2 P yK1,K2B1 −R2 + γB>2 P
y
K1,K2
B2
]
,
R˜ =
[
R˜1 + γB˜
>
1 P
z
L1,L2
B˜1 −γB˜>1 P zL1,L2B˜2
−γB˜>2 P zL1,L2B˜1 −R˜2 + γB˜>2 P zL1,L2B˜2
]
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where
ΣyK1,K2 = E
∑
t≥0
γtyK1,K2t (y
K1,K2
t )
>
 , ΣzL1,L2 = E
∑
t≥0
γtzL1,L2t (z
L1,L2
t )
>
 .
Proposition 46 (Policy gradient expression). For any θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ, we have for j = 1, 2,
∇KjC(θ1, θ2) = 2Ey,jK1,K2Σ
y
K1,K2
, ∇LjC(θ1, θ2) = 2Ez,jL1,L2ΣzL1,L2 .(88)
Proof. We note that the utility can be split as
C(θ1, θ2) = Ey˜,z˜
[
Cy(K1,K2, y˜) + Cz(L1, L2, z˜)
]
where Cy, Cz are defined by (53a)–(53b). Let us consider the first part. We have
Cy(K1,K2, y˜) = E
∑
t≥0
γt
[
(yL1,L2t )
>QyK1,K2t
+ (u1,t − u¯1,t)>R1(u1,t − u¯1,t)− (u2,t − u¯2,t)>R2(u2,t − u¯2,t) | y0 = y˜
]
.
We note, using the above definition together with (86) and the dynamics satisfied by yK1,K2t = x
θ1,θ2
t −
x¯θ1,θ2t , that
Cy(K1,K2, y˜) = y˜
>P yK1,K2 y˜ +
γ
1− γE[(
1
1)
>P yK1,K2
1
1],
from which we deduce that ∇y˜Cy(K1,K2, y˜) = 2P yK1,K2 y˜. Moreover,
Cy(K1,K2, y˜) = y˜
>(Q+K>1 R1K1 −K>2 R2K2)y˜
+ γE
[
Cy
(
K1,K2, (A−B1K1 +B2K2)y˜
)
| y0 = y˜
]
.
Using the two above equalities and the chain rule, we obtain (using the fact that R1 is symmetric)
∇K1Cy(K1,K2, y˜) = 2R1K1y˜y˜> − 2γB>1 P yK1,K2(A−B1K1 +B2K2)y˜y˜>
+ γE
[
∇K1Cy
(
K1,K2, y˜
′
)∣∣y˜′=(A−B1K1+B2K2)y˜+11
]
.
Using recursion and the equation satisfied by P yK1,K2 leads to the expression (88) for ∇K1C(θ1, θ2). One
can proceed similarly for the gradients with respect to K2, L1 and L2. 
7.2. Model-based policy optimization. Let us assume that the model is known and both players
can see the actions of one another at the end of each time step. To explain the intuition behind the
iterative methods, we first express the optimal control of a player when the other player has a fixed
control. For some given θ2 = (K2, L2), the inner minimization problem for player 1 becomes an LQR
problem with instantaneous utility at time t:
(xt − x¯t)>QK2(xt − x¯t) + x¯>Q˜K2 x¯
+ (u1,t − u¯1,t)>R1(u1,t − u¯1,t) + u¯>1,t(R1 + R¯1)u¯1,t,
when player 1 uses control u1, where QK2 = Q−K2R2K2 and Q˜L2 = Q˜−L2R˜2L2, and state dynamics
given by:
xt+1 = AK2xt + A¯K2,L2 x¯t +B1u1,t + B¯1u¯1,t + 
0
t+1 + 
1
t+1,
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where AK2 = A + B2K2 and A¯K2,L2 = A¯ + B¯2L2 + B2(L2 − K2). Inspired by the results in [36],
we propose to find the stationary point θ∗1(θ2) = (K∗1 (K2), L∗1(L2)) of the inner problem. By setting
∇θ1C(θ1, θ2) = 0 and by Proposition 46, this yields
(89) K∗1 (K2) = γ(R1 + γB
>
1 P
y
K2
B1)
−1B>1 P
y
K2
[A+B2K2] ,
where P yK2 = P
y
K∗1 (K2),K2
solves
P yK2 = Q˜K2 + γA˜
>
K2P
y
K2
A˜K2 − γ2A˜>K2P yK2B1(R1 + γB>1 P
y
K2
B1)
−1B>1 P
y
K2
A˜K2 ,
where Q˜K2 = Q − K>2 R2K2 and A˜K2 = A + B2K2. This equation is obtained by considering the
equation (86) for P yK1,K2 and replacing K1 by the above expression (89) for K
∗
1 (K2). One can similarly
introduce K∗2 (K1), which is the optimal K2 for a given K1, and likewise for L∗1(L2), L∗2(L1).
Based on this idea and inspired by the works of Fazel et al. [36] and Zhang et al. [51], we propose
two iterative algorithms relying on policy-gradient methods, namely alternating-gradient and gradient-
descent-ascent, to find the optimal values of θ1 and θ2. Starting from an initial guess of the control
parameters, the players update either alternatively or simultaneously their parameters by following the
gradients of the utility function. In the alternating-gradient (AG) method, the players take turn in
updating their parameters. Between two updates of θ2, θ1 is updated Nmax1 times. This procedure
is summarized in Algorithm 1, which is based on nested loops. In the gradient-descent-ascent (GDA)
method, all the control parameters are updated synchronously at each iteration, as presented in Algo-
rithm 2.
At each step of these methods, the gradients can be computed directly using the formulas provided
in Proposition 46. For instance, in the inner loop of the alternating-gradient method, based on (88),
parameter K1 can be updated as follows:
Kn1+1,n21 = K
n1,n2
1 − η1∇K1C(θn1,n21 , θn2−12 )
= Kn1,n2 − 2η1
[
(R1 +B
>
1 P
y
K
n1,n2
1 ,K
n2−1
2
B1)K
n1,n2
1
−B>1 P yKn1,n21 ,Kn2−12 A˜Kn2−12
]
Σ
K
n1,n2
1 ,K
n2−1
2
.
Then, in the outer loop, one can compute ∇K2C at the point (θN
max
1 ,n2
1 , θ
n2−1
2 ) using again (88).
In order to have a benchmark, one can compute the equilibrium (θ∗1, θ∗2) by solving the Riccati
equations (60)–(76). Alternatively, the Nash equilibrium can be computed by finding K2 such that
∇K2Cy(K∗1 (k2),K2)∣∣k2=K2 = 0. The left-hand side has an explicit expression obtained by combin-
ing (88) and (89).
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Algorithm 1 Alternating-Gradient method
Input: Number of inner and outer iterations Nmax1 ,Nmax2 ; initial guess θ01, θ02; learning rates η1, η2
Output: (K∗1 ,K∗2 )
θ0,11 ← θ01
for n2 = 1, 2, . . . ,Nmax2 do
for n1 = 1, 2, . . . ,Nmax1 do
θn1,n21 ← θn1−1,n21 − η1∇θ1C(θn1−1,n21 , θn2−12 )
end for
θn22 ← θn2−12 + η2∇θ2C(θN
max
1 ,n2
1 , θ
n2−1
2 )
end for
return (θN
max
1 ,Nmax2
1 , θ
Nmax2
2 )
Algorithm 2 Gradient-Descent-Ascent method
Input: Number of iterations Nmax; initial guess θ01, θ02; learning rates η1, η2
Output: (K∗1 ,K∗2 )
for n = 1, 2, . . . ,Nmax do
θn1 ← θn−11 − η1∇θ1C(θn−11 , θn−12 )
θn2 ← θn−12 + η2∇θ2C(θn−11 , θn−12 )
end for
return (θNmax1 , θN
max
2 )
7.3. Sample-based policy optimization. The aforementioned methods use explicit expressions for
the gradients, which rely on the knowledge of the model (the coefficients of the dynamics and the utility
function). However, in many situations these coefficients are not known. Instead, let us assume that
we have access to the following (stochastic) simulator, called MKV simulator and denoted by STMKV :
given a control parameter θ = (θ1, θ2) = (K1, L1,K2, L2), STMKV (θ) returns a sample of the mean-field
utility (i.e., the quantity inside the expectation in equation (5)) for the MKV dynamics (4) using the
control θ and truncated at time horizon T , which is similar to the one introduced in [28] (when there is
a single controller). In other words, it returns a realization of the social utility
∑T −1
t=0 γ
tct, where ct is
the instantaneous mean-field utility at time t, see (6). This is used in Algorithm 3, which provides a way
to estimate the gradient of the utility with respect to the control parameters of the first player. One can
estimate the gradient with respect to the control parameters of the second player in an analogous way.
The estimation algorithm uses the simulator to obtain realizations of the (truncated) utility when using
perturbed versions of the controls. In order to estimate the gradient of Cy, we use 2M perturbations
v1,1,i, v1,2,i which are i.i.d. with uniform distribution µSτ over the sphere Sτ of radius τ . The first
index corresponds to the player (1 or 2), the second index corresponds to the part of the control being
perturbed (K or L) and the last index corresponds to the index of the perturbation (between 1 and M).
See e.g. [36] for more details. Notice that, although the simulator needs to know the model in order to
sample the dynamics and compute the utilities, Algorithm 3 uses this simulator as a black-box (or an
oracle), and hence uses only samples from the model and not the model itself.
7.4. Numerical Results. We now provide numerical results both for model-based and sample-based
versions of the two methods presented in the previous section.
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Algorithm 3 Sample-Based Gradient Estimation for Player 1
Data: Parameter θ = (θ1, θ2) = (K1, L1,K2, L2); number of perturbations M ; length T ; radius τ
Result: An estimator for ∇θ1C(θ)
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M do
Sample v1,1,i, v1,2,i i.i.d. ∼ µSτ
Set θˇ1,i := (K1,i, L1,i) := (K1 + v1,1,i, L1 + v1,2,i)
Set θˇi = (θˇ1,i, θ2)
Sample C˜i using MKV simulator STMKV (θˇi)
end for
Set ∇˜K1C(θ) = dτ2 1M
∑M
i=1 C˜
iv1,1,i,
and ∇˜L1C(θ) = dτ2 1M
∑M
i=1 C˜
iv1,2,i
Return: ∇˜θ1C(θ) := diag
(
∇˜K1C(θ), ∇˜L1C(θ)
)
Setting. The specification of the model used in the simulations is given in Table 1. This setting
has been chosen so that it allows us to illustrate the convergence of the method when the equilibrium
controls are not symmetric, i.e. θ1 6= θ2. To be able to visualize the convergence of the controls, we
focus on a one-dimensional example, that is, d = ` = 1.
Model-based results. The parameters used are given in Table 1. This choice of parameters is
based on the values used for a single controller in [28] and numerical experiments.
Fig. 1 displays the trajectory of (K1,K2) 7→ Cy(K1,K2) and (L1, L2) 7→ Cz(L1, L2) generated by the
iterations of AG and DGA methods. Iterations are counted in the following way: in AG at iteration
k, (θk1 , θk2) = (θ
kmodNmax1 ,dk/Nmax1 e
1 , θ
dk/Nmax1 e−1
2 ), while in DGA one step of for-loop corresponds to one
iteration. The utility at the starting point and the utility at the Nash equilibrium are respectively given
by a black star and a red dot. In the AG method, since θ1 is updated Nmax1 times between two updates
of θ2, the trajectory moves faster in the θ1-direction until it reaches an approximate best response
against θ2, after which the trajectory moves towards the Nash equilibrium. This is also confirmed by
the convergence of the parameters θ = (K1, L1,K2, L2) in Fig. 2(a). The relative error on the utility is
shown in Fig. 2(b). We observe that the convergence is slower with AG because player 2 updates her
control only every Nmax1 iterations.
Sample-based results. The parameters used are given in Table 1 and were chosen based on the
values in [28] as well as numerical experiments. The figures are obtained by averaging the results over 5
experiments, each based on a different realization of the randomness in the initial points, in the dynamics
and in the gradient estimation.
Fig. 3 displays the trajectory of (K1,K2) 7→ Cy(K1,K2) and (L1, L2) 7→ Cz(L1, L2) generated by the
iterations of AG and DGA methods. The convergence of the parameters θ = (K1, L1,K2, L2) is shown
in Fig. 4(a). The evolution of the relative error on the utility is shown in Fig. 4(b).
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied zero-sum mean-field type games with linear quadratic model under
infinite-horizon discounted utility function. We have identified the closed-form expression of the Nash
equilibrium controls as linear combinations of the state and its mean. Moreover, we have proposed two
policy optimization methods to learn the equilibrium. Numerical results have shown the convergence
of the two methods in both model-based and sample-based settings. The question of convergence of
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(a) (b)
Figure 1. Model-based policy optimization: Convergence of each part of the utility.
(a) Cy as a function of (K1,K2). (b) Cz as a function of (L1, L2).
(a) (b)
Figure 2. Model-based policy optimization: Convergence of the control parameters
in (a) and of the relative error on the utility in (b).
the algorithms proposed here as well as model-free methods for non-LQ or general-sum MFTG will be
studied in future works.
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